THE END OF STORMONT **ANDREW BOYD**

THE NATION

MAY 1, 1972 50 cents

8-72
The Sherrod Library
Periodicals Dept.
E. Tennessee St. Univ.
Johnson City, Tn. 37601

APR 3 8:2E

FLORIDA—FOR SALE AGAIN

ITT Subdivides Paradise

Michael F. Toner

ARMS BUDGET

The Pentagon Stokes Inflation

Richard F. Kaufman

Nathan G. Hale, Jr. / 'Freud and the Americans'

Milton Cantor

GEORGE WALLACE, FAKE POPULIST

Kenneth Reich

ETSU LIBRARY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LETTERS

letter from Hanoi

Hanoi, North Vietnam

DEAR SIRS: On behalf of the committee we thank you very much for the issues of *The Nation* you sent us last year. We appreciate your informative paper which is very useful for us. Especially, your paper has had very good articles on the Vietnamese War, thus helping the American people understand the situation in Indochina and laying bare the reactionary, deceptive nature of the U.S. Government's war policy. . . .

Tran Trong Quat, Secretary
Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the American People

today's breed

Yonkers, N.Y.

DEAR SIRS: This is a word of thanks from a conservationist for Michael Kennedy's fine review of *Future Environments of North America* [*The Nation*, Apr. 17]. Also a few niggles. . . .

It may be true, as Mr. Kennedy asserts, that the conservation movement was once heavily peopled by "Wasps." But a large number of the most effective conservationists I know today—if not a majority—cannot be so classified. Mr. Kennedy *does* qualify his statement with an "until very recently." But his implication that the conservation movement is predominantly peopled by prosperous and long-established Protestant families is now so far from the truth that I think he weakens his otherwise excellent discussion by putting such emphasis on a circumstance so outdated.

"The immediate beneficiaries . . . have been the conservationists themselves," says Kennedy, with some truth if the word immediate is emphasized and if the examples taken are chiefly places like Big Sur. But again, Kennedy just doesn't seem to know who the conservationists are these days. A participant in the conservation debates of the recent New York State Constitutional Convention has told me that the most eloquent plea the convention heard for preservation of the "forever wild" clause that protects the Adirondack Forest Preserve was from a black woman delegate from Brooklyn who had never seen the Adirondacks. . . .

"The established conservation societies cannot sponsor direct-action tactics . . ." says Kennedy, because of the IRS and tax exemption. Again he seems unaware of today's facts. Friends of the Earth, its associated League of Conservation Voters, Environmental Action, Zero Population Growth and others have eschewed tax-deductible status to be free to lobby—and they do, as the defeat of the SST, the Everglades jetport, etc., proves. . . .

Stewart Ogilvy

burden of responsibility

Philadelphia, Pa.

DEAR SIRS: Prof. A. V. Bushkovitch's rejoinder [letter, Apr. 10] to Theodore Roszak's favorable review of Ravetz's *Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems* . . . dismayed me.

The professor states, in summary, that scientists of the past and present are faultless for the anti-social and destructive purposes to which their discoveries have been put; that scientists are helpless captives of their societies.

This bleak and hopeless approach was not shared by Einstein, Oppenheimer, Fermi and Szilard . . . nor by scientists associated with *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*; nor by the Society for Social Responsibility in Science.

Jerome Ravetz, with growing though still not a majority support from an international scientific community, has been a prime mover in the development of a philosophy of science, which, among other things, states that in modern society, capitalist or Marxist, scientists must accept social responsibility for their research, whether pure or practical.

One could read Professor Bushkovitch's rejoinder as an apologia for scientists working on . . . militarily financed projects, but this might be unfair. . . . If he would skip through the book, or read it carefully, he would emerge, I think, in basic agreement with Ravetz and Roszak.

Leif A. Dahl

EDITORIALS

Mr. Nixon in Action

The most appalling aspect of President Nixon's reversion to the policy of bombing North Vietnam on a scale larger than ever before is that it makes almost no sense militarily and seems to have been motivated by a combination of neurosis and political expediency.

Nixon was and is furious that the Russians would encourage or tolerate such an offensive as the North Vietnamese have launched shortly before his scheduled trip to Moscow, Warsaw, Teheran and perhaps other diplomatic way stations. He does not seem to consider the possibility that the Russians (or the Chinese) are either unwilling or unable to pull his chestnuts out of the fire. Nor does he seem to have analyzed the possible motives of the North Vietnamese. According to both Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird, they have committed twelve of their thirteen combat divisions to a climactic battle in South Vietnam. They know that this will entail heavy losses and grave risks. Why have they abandoned their long-standing strategy of hit, withdraw and hit again, to adopt warfare of the World War II type, under the serious disadvantage that the South Vietnamese and the Americans have command of the air over the battlefield? There must be a compelling reason for this shift, and it could be that the North Vietnamese feel they had better hit hard now, before Nixon settles down in the Kremlin to talk business with the Russians.

In such situations, everyone looks out for himself first; allies are treasured for their usefulness and nothing else. If the American and Soviet negotiators should agree that it is to their mutual advantage to cool the war in Indochina, the Soviets might reduce their aid in the future. It is obvious that both superpowers have larger stakes in a possible cooperative relationship than in continuing to fight by proxy in Southeast Asia. Under the circumstances, the North Vietnamese have every reason to be wary of the firmness of the Russian commitment.

As Nixon sees it, he had to strike back, not because he or his advisers think the bombing raids will have much direct effect on the North Vietnamese offensive, but because if he went traipsing off to Moscow without staging some retaliation, he might arouse the wrath of the right wing in his own party. At the same time, he obviously feels that he can turn the North Vietnamese offensive to temporary political advantage by using it to redefine the war and its causes. While he has carefully stayed in the background, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have been attempting to convince the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "a whole new war" was launched when the enemy violated those mysterious agreements and launched concerted attacks on its sister state of South Vietnam. This, we are asked to believe, changes the entire equation and shifts the onus for the raids—and all that may follow—to the North Vietnamese and the Russians. The Russians are to be rebuked for their aid to North Vietnam, while we have every right, apparently, to furnish 1,000 American planes and more than 500 American helicopters to Thieu, whose pilots in an air force of 40,000 men have been trained in the United States. Phony as this attempted re-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

definition is, it has apparently swung Senators Cooper and Aiken back into the hawk column.

Nixon's recent actions should make it clear, to all those who were still deluding themselves, just where matters now stand. The war is not winding down; it has simply taken to the air, as required by domestic political considerations. There are no limitations on what we may do by way of further retaliation, short of sending combat troops back to Vietnam (those now there may not be removed on schedule) or resorting to nuclear weapons. All of this should convince the electorate that the only way to end this war is to get Nixon and his cabal out of the White House. His four years there have cost the country a fearful price, in morale, in money and property and wealth, in missed opportunities for social reconstruction, in Asian and American lives. Do we want four more years of such incompetence, irresponsibility, deception and arrogance, or have we had enough?

CAMPAIGN '72

Issues Galore

The Democrats are short of funds but if the party can pull itself together at Miami, it will not want for potent issues. The big issue, Vietnam, has been re-emphasized by the Hanoi-Haiphong bombings. Even if the North Vietnam offensive is slowed down—and even if ARVN does better than expected—the prospects of an early political settlement are not bright and the war will remain a major issue from now through November 7. Nixon's line will change, of course. It is all the fault of the Russians—not any flaw in his game plan to end the war—that a large residual force of planes, ships and combat troops remain in Vietnam and that the POWs are not released. Over and over and over again, he will say that he has brought most of the ground troops home, and that he has tried to end the war. We shall be coaxed to forget that his plan was basically flawed in the sense that he never intended to terminate a U.S. military presence-by-proxy or that the fighting has merely been shifted from the ground to the skies and coastal waters. But say what he will, the war will continue to haunt him and it is doubtful that he can pick up additional support by giving the issue an anti-Soviet emphasis.

The Kleindienst issue also remains a good one. If he is ultimately confirmed, the implication will be worse than it would be if his name were withdrawn. Apart from his role in the ITT affair, Kleindienst is vulnerable on two counts. His failure to recognize that he was being offered a $100,000 bribe in the form of a campaign contribution until one week after the offer was made hardly recommends him for the office of Attorney General. Minutes after he learned that Robert T. Carson, the suspended administrative assistant to Senator Fong, was under investigation by the FBI, it dawned on him that he had been propositioned! Or consider the acknowledgment by Assistant Attorney General Peterson that U.S. Atty. Harry Steward in San Diego—curious how often San Diego pops up in the scandals of this Administration—had been guilty of "gross impropriety" (he had not wanted to investigate a sponsor who, he said, had promised to

IN THIS ISSUE

May 1, 1972

EDITORIALS

546

ARTICLES

550 George Wallace, Fake Populist — *Kenneth Reich*
552 The End of Stormont — *Andrew Boyd*
555 Arms Budget: The Pentagon Stokes Inflation — *Richard F. Kaufman*
558 Winners and Losers: The Divided Working Class — *Andrew Levison*
562 Florida—For Sale Again: ITT Subdivides Paradise — *Michael F. Toner*

BOOKS & THE ARTS

565 Hale: Freud and the Americans — *Milton Cantor*
566 Elevitch: Grips — *Ronald De Feo*
568 Hook (poem) — *Erica Jong*
570 Sheehan: The Arnheiter Affair — *Philip Blake*
570 Baker: Brahmin in Revolt — *Eugene G. Windchy*
571 Final Exam (poem) — *Gary Gildner*
572 Mulvihill: Night of the Axe — *Dan Levin*
573 Barnet: Roots of War — *Richard J. Walton*
573 Bamboo (poem) — *Barbara Hughes*
574 Films — *Robert Hatch*

Publisher
JAMES J. STORROW Jr.

Editor
CAREY McWILLIAMS

Associate Publisher
GIFFORD PHILLIPS

Executive Editor
ROBERT HATCH

Literary Editor
EMILE CAPOUYA

Copy Editor, MARION HESS; Poetry Editor, ROBERT HAZEL; Theatre, HAROLD CLURMAN; Art, LAWRENCE ALLOWAY; Music, DAVID HAMILTON; Science, CARL DREHER; Advertising Manager, MARY SIMON; Circulation Manager, ROSE M. GREEN.

Editorial Associate, ERNEST GRUENING

Washington, ROBERT SHERRILL; London, RAYMOND WILLIAMS; Paris, CLAUDE BOURDET; Bonn, C. AMERY; Jerusalem, HERBERT KROSNEY; Canberra, C. P. FITZGERALD; U.N., ANNE TUCKERMAN.

The Nation is published weekly (except biweekly in July and August) by the Nation Company and copyright 1972 in the U.S.A. by the Nation Associates, Inc., 333 Sixth Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10014. Tel: CH 2-8400. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

Subscription Price: One year $12.50; two years, $23. Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign.

Change of Address: It is essential that subscribers ordering a change of address give five weeks' notice and provide their old as well as their new address. Please give Zip Code numbers for both addresses.

Manuscripts. All work submitted will be read by the editors. The magazine cannot, however, be responsible for the return of unsolicited manuscripts unless they are accompanied by stamped, self-addressed envelopes.

Information to Libraries: The Nation is indexed in Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Book Review Digest, Book Review Index and the Public Affairs Information Service.

THE NATION

Volume 214
No. 18

The Sherrod Library
EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY
Johnson City, Tennessee
LICENSED TO ETSU.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recommended him for a judgeship). Despite this bland acknowledgment, Kleindienst has taken no action to remove Steward. Such conduct stimulates recollections of Harry Micajah Daugherty who served as Warren G. Harding's Attorney General.

Then there is the sudden decision, after two years, to initiate an antitrust action against the major networks. Why was the action brought just at this time? Asked about the possibility of such a suit in 1969, Mr. Mitchell said that it was "the last thing in the world that we have under consideration." Filing it now was no doubt intended to demonstrate, in the wake of the ITT scandal, the antitrust reflexes of Kleindienst, his *machismo* as a trustbuster. At the same time, of course, it was a rather crude way of putting the networks on notice that they had better "be fair" to the Republicans. The trouble with such stratagems is that they are too palpable. Cover-ups must be better staged if they are to be effective and blackmail should not be so obvious.

There is also the matter of the new orders that direct the military to police the Caribbean, "by force if necessary," to protect the merchant ships of friendly nations. The only ships the Cubans have in any manner interfered with have been operated by Cuban exiles under circumstances that strongly suggest they were engaged in illegal activities against Cuba. What is most amazing about the new orders is the way authority is devolved, step by step, down to local commanders, who can act without specific authorization, without clear evidence of wrongdoing, and without a request from the governments whose ships might be threatened. Jerry Landauer reports in *The Wall Street Journal* that "this scary-sounding scenario" has worried even some hard-line Navy officers. At a time when the President's war-making powers are under close legislative scrutiny, the issuance of these harebrained orders constitutes an open provocation to the Senate. What could have prompted it? Benjamin Welles reports in *The New York Times* that the President's aggressiveness was presumably not being lost on the 600,000 anti-Castro Cuban exiles in this country, of whom nearly 100,000 have become voters.

Last week I received a letter from the Finance Committee for the Re-election of the President which stated that he deserves re-election "because he has helped bring back law and order in America." That is a curious statement. The Department of Justice's own figures show a 31 per cent increase in serious crime in the last three years. These same records show that the rate of criminal convictions has steadily dropped over the last five years. Eleven moderate-to-liberal Republican Senators have offered a program to combat crime that is not to be reconciled with the President's stand on the issue he belabored most strenuously in 1968.

Vast sums have been ladled out by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration with no appreciable effect on crime rates. A CBS documentary, taking off from what Joseph Goulden had to say about the LEAA boondoggle in a prize-winning *Nation* article, sums up the results in its title: "The Unrealized Promise of Safe Streets." Certain police chiefs—Miami's is a case in point—say that they have received no help whatever from the program. Others tell a different story. In Melbourne, Fla., the police got $100,000 and spent it for: TV equipment, recorders and transcribing machines, a law library, a police legal adviser, and fifty-six $1,000-a-year police cadets; but the chief admits that there has been no reduction in crime. A House subcommittee, after investigation, reports that the LEAA program "has had no visible impact on the incidence of crime in the United States."

The "anti-crime" record of this Administration is even worse than this finding suggests. James F. Ahern, former New Haven Chief of Police, contends in *Police in Trouble* that the Administration has been damaging law enforcement. "Crime is a legitimate problem," he said in a recent interview, "but in the last five years it has been exploited in a bad way. We've had a lot of talk that has increased the paranoia level. But no one at the national level is working on solving the real problems."

Looming large is an issue of great long-term importance: Nixon and the Constitution. In the areas of civil rights—the bussing moratorium proposal, church-and-state relations and civil liberties—the Administration has acted in a way calculated to weaken specific constitutional guarantees. "Anti-bussing"—the counterpart of "social issues" in the 1970 campaign—has not had quite the hypnotic effect the Administration hoped it would have. On second thought, many conservatives have sensed the implications of legislation designed to interfere with the judicial process. Then, too, a significant section of the electorate has realized that the issue is a smoke screen to conceal the fact that Nixon is beating a retreat from the concept of integration, with or without bussing. In terms of civil liberties, Richard Harris' article on "The New Justice" in *The New Yorker* of March 25, is a brilliant and thorough summation of the case against the Administration. Let Nixon have four more years in office and the basic constitutional guarantees will be dangerously undermined.

No, the Democrats do not want for issues.

* * *

Footnote: One learns with pleasure that George E. Brown, Jr., is alive and well and running for Congress in the newly created 38th District in California. Few Congressmen have had a better record than Mr. Brown and his re-election to the Congress—he ran for the Senate against John Tunney in 1970 and lost—would be the best of good news.

CAREY MCWILLIAMS

Connally's Gall

Last year Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was going down the drain. It had a cost overrun on the C-5A transport so prodigious that even the Air Force balked. Lockheed, in tears, came to the Congress as its last hope. By a paper-thin margin, the Congress created the Emergency Loan Guarantee Board (ELGB) with which Lockheed has a drawing account of $250 million for its salvation. The members of the board are Treasury Secretary John B. Connally, Jr., chairman; Arthur Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; and William J. Casey, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Everyone was happy, or at least as happy as could be expected under the distressing circumstances which initiated the passage of the law, until Comptroller General

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cases as high as 35 per cent, only because the bill contained important consumer benefits. Wallace told the interviewers he would call a special session of the legislature to reduce the interest rates, a pledge discounted the next day as "politics" by his legislative floor leaders, who said he had never mentioned such a plan to them. Meanwhile, John Ripp, of Birmingham, head of the state's largest consumers' association, characterized as illusory the consumer benefits in the bill Wallace signed. Ripp disclosed that his group had strongly urged the Governor to veto the bill.

Since the beginning of his career, Wallace has laid heavy stress on the Populist aspects of his state program. It is true that during his and his late wife's terms of office Wallace did build a great many junior colleges and trade schools, but these schools, like other public schools in Alabama, remain grossly underfunded. Alabama is last among the states in per-pupil expenditures. After becoming Governor again in 1971, he organized a low-cost medical insurance plan for Alabamans under 65, in cooperation with private insurance companies. But there is no state contribution.

Sensitive to the apparent effectiveness of organized labor's campaign against him in the closing stages of the 1968 Presidential campaign, Wallace also worked last year to strengthen some of Alabama's labor legislation. He signed bills extending coverage of the state's workmen's compensation law, providing full statutory coverage for all occupational diseases and extending the time for filing claims. Alabama's laws in this field are now comparable to those in other Southern states, but the South remains behind most of the rest of the country, and labor representatives point to the continuing gaps in the workmen's compensation law of Alabama. Agricultural workers are still not covered, widows receive no death benefits, and a totally disabled worker is not assured of indefinitely continuing coverage.

In a frantic and almost unsuccessful effort to oust Albert P. Brewer and regain the governorship in 1970, Wallace outdid himself in making promises. Most of the major ones he has been unable to keep; his record on that score is clear. In other areas, however, the record is murky. The Governor often assumes in public a position quite different from the one his closely controlled legislative leaders are taking in private. Last year, he publicly endorsed a key bill on legislative ethics, while at the same time sending it back to the legislature with executive amendments that assured its defeat. Occasionally, he has let a bill become law without formally signing it, although he had apparently backed it, so that later he could claim to have had nothing to do with it.

Wallace has always had a taste for hyperbole. In 1970, one of his favorite campaign stories concerned the twenty-six bathrooms, "some of them with gold-plated faucets," which he claimed Postmaster Gen. Winton M. Blount had in his mansion outside Montgomery. Blount's bathrooms, Wallace said, symbolized the moneyed opposition to his candidacy. Alabamans enjoyed the story, although they knew it to be an exaggeration. Similarly, a recent statewide poll indicated that few Alabamans believed Wallace would carry out his campaign promises, and few expressed disappointment that he had not.

Still, it is a matter of public record that, in addition to his unfulfilled promises about the utilities, Wallace pledged an end to the state sales tax on groceries, and promised a four-lane highway linking all the major towns in the state. He said he would issue an executive order to reassign every student transferred by court integration orders, and would call for a Southwide governors' meeting to create a united front against such orders. Thus far, none of these promises has been honored, nor has the Governor proceeded very far toward their implementation.

Another major Wallace promise—no new taxes without a vote of the people—has been kept, to the extent that, with the minor exception of some truckers' fees, there have been no new taxes. The promise, however, was spurious, since no such vote is provided for by the state constitution. Indeed, taxes provide what is perhaps the clearest contradiction between Wallace's verbalized Populism and his actual Populism.

In Wisconsin, a state which has one of the highest property-tax schedules in the nation, Wallace made the point that Alabama has the lowest. That is true, but Alabama makes up for it with a sales tax of 4 to 7 per cent, depending on the county, and with a host of other taxes that fall heavily on low-income groups. The maximum personal and corporate income tax rates are held at 5 per cent and what few property tax assessments there are vary widely. Counties assess at anywhere from 4 to 27 per cent of real market value, and some valuable timberland is assessed as low as 17¢ an acre—less than the cost of fire protection. Thus, while Alabama's state and local property tax collections, as a percentage of personal income, are the lowest of any state in the country,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the state is well above the national average in terms of state and local taxes imposed per $1,000 of personal income.

Although property taxes may in some states be so high that they force inadvisably early urbanization of farmlands and constitute an unjust burden on low-income homeowners, most tax experts believe the property tax in Alabama is far too low for the well-being of the people. One result has been that education must struggle along without much local financing and that state financing is inadequate. And under Wallace, education does not seem to have received even its fair share: statistics published by the National Education Association show that Alabama was fortieth in per-capita state tax revenues from all sources, fiftieth in revenues from the property tax and fiftieth in per-pupil educational expenditures.

While a more authentically Populist Governor, Reubin O. Askew of neighboring Florida, has made heavier corporate profit and severance taxes the key items of his tax program, Wallace has said very little and done nothing to make business interests carry a greater share of the revenue load in Alabama. Such reform might well begin with a fair property tax, but during the first Wallace administration the limit on corporate taxes was written into the state constitution, making it that much harder to change.

In that first Wallace term, $35 million in new sales taxes were imposed by a penny increase adopted by the Wallace-controlled legislature and signed into law by the Governor. Yet Wallace maintained then, and maintains still, that the sales tax increase went into effect against his wishes. The story of that increase is typical of the way Wallace moves on a number of issues.

In his 1962 campaign, he had made it evident that new taxes would be necessary by pledging "an immediate increase in the per-pupil expenditure [on education] to at least three-fourths the national average." (By 1970, it had reached only 57 per cent of the average.) After being sworn in, Wallace asked for new taxes, but did not specify what kind; ostensibly, he was leaving that to the legislature.

The major alternatives discussed would have entailed an increase in the state income tax and an end to reporting federal income taxes as deductions. Property tax reform was not seriously considered. The evidence indicates that Wallace favored a higher sales tax and maneuvered through legislative supporters to have it adopted.

First, a filibuster had to be broken in the state Senate. One of the filibustering Senators said on the floor that he was desisting because he had promised the Governor to let the sales tax increase be voted upon. In the House, one of Wallace's floor leaders declared, "The Governor wants the sales tax bill to come out of committee." The chief Wallace floor leader, state Rep. Rankin Fite, voted for the tax, and it also won the support of the legislator from Wallace's home county. On another occasion, Wallace pressed for a key rules committee meeting to expedite the bill. Finally, on a night when the fate of the sales tax was in doubt, Wallace hurriedly left a dinner to return to the capitol, telling fellow diners, "We've got to pass that sales tax bill."

The sales tax increase of 1963 was the largest single increase in Wallace's years as Governor. It fell most heavily upon some of the poor whites who have constituted the backbone of his Alabama support. He has never done anything to take taxes off these people at home, nor to shift the burden to the business interests he has claimed he was against. So much for the plausibility of his tax reform platform for the 1972 Democratic primaries! □

THE END OF STORMONT

ANDREW BOYD
Mr. Boyd, a frequent contributor, is the author of Holy War in Belfast, *which has just been published here by Grove Press. His most recent book is* The Rise of the Irish Trade Unions, 1729-1970, *issued by Anvil Books, Dublin.*

The decision of the British to suspend the Parliament of Northern Ireland for one year from March 30, 1972 and to impose direct rule from Westminster dismayed the Ulster Unionists and so surprised the Catholics that they did not at first realize what an important change had come about. On March 24, the day on which Edward Heath told the British House of Commons that Stormont was to be suspended, the leaders of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, which is the main opposition party in Northern Ireland, met across the border in County Donegal. They eventually decided to accept Heath's proposals and to recommend that the Irish Republican Army cease its guerrilla activities in Northern Ireland. The IRA seemed little inclined to take such advice; Heath had scarcely finished his speech when Sean MacStiophain, chief of staff of the Provisional IRA, said that the struggle must continue.

But MacStiophain was speaking from the safety of his headquarters in the Republic of Ireland, and his statement, which was probably calculated to forestall any call for a cessation of hostilities, angered many Republicans and their supporters in Northern Ireland. They thought he spoke too hastily. He particularly angered the people of Belfast and Derry who had been shielding and supplying the local units of the IRA and who had, therefore, been suffering the full force of the British Army's counter-insurgency operations since they began in June 1970. Those people wanted peace and a chance, once Stormont was gone, to work out a new future for themselves.

The Northern Ireland Parliament and Government were established in 1920 under the Government of Ireland Act, a statute which, Westminster hoped, would end the conflict in Ireland, settle differences between Ireland and England, reconcile Nationalists and Unionists, and even-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tually lead to the formation of a Parliament and government for all Ireland. Southern Ireland refused to accept the Government of Ireland Act and eventually, through a treaty with Britain, settled for a Free State with Dominion status. Northern Ireland remained, but the powers of its Parliament were limited. Ultimate authority rested with Westminster, which alone could amend, repeal or suspend the Government of Ireland Act.

In his Commons speech Heath set out very clearly the terms under which Stormont was to be suspended. The suspension was to be for one year, so that everyone might have time to work out a better system of government for Northern Ireland, a system in which the Catholic minority would have proportionate power in the administration. Systems of proportionate government in Switzerland, Lebanon and in other places where there are multiracial or multireligious communities are now being studied in London. The Government of Ireland Act had originally allowed for proportional representation, but that system was abolished by the Stormont Parliament in 1929.

Heath's other points were that during the suspension the internment of Republicans and others who had been held without charge or trial since August 1971 was to be "phased out"; there were to be periodic plebiscites to test if the people of Northern Ireland wanted to remain in the United Kingdom or become part of a united Ireland; and responsibility for internal security in Northern Ireland was to be transferred to London. Meanwhile Britain would guarantee that as long as the majority of Ulster people wished to remain British they would not be forced into a united Ireland.

But there was more to Heath's plan than mere consideration for the fears and feelings of the Protestants of Northern Ireland. The disturbances had brought international discredit on the British Government. The world knew that Stormont's Special Powers Act was more repressive than the security laws of Spain, South Africa or Greece. The report of Sir Edmund Compton's committee on the torture of political prisoners in Belfast by Faulkner's police and by the British Army, the later recommendations of Lord Parker that such torture should not be used as a method of interrogation, and a further report on the torture by Amnesty International left no doubt in the opinion of other countries that Britain was to blame. Bloody Sunday (January 30) in Derry, when thirteen civil rights demonstrators were shot dead by British paratroopers, made Heath's position vis-à-vis Northern Ireland impossible. It looked as though the disturbances and the terror would continue indefinitely. There would be more Bloody Sundays, more deaths, more bombs and destruction.

That is why Heath had proposed, even before his decision finally to suspend Stormont, that responsibility for internal security in Northern Ireland should be transferred from Stormont to Westminster. "We are concerned," said Heath in his speech on March 24, "about the present responsibility for law and order between Belfast and Westminster whereby control remains largely with the Northern Ireland Government while operational responsibility rests mainly with the British Army and, therefore, with the United Kingdom. This responsibility is not merely domestic; it is a matter of international concern as well."

Macpherson (Toronto Star)

Edward of Orange

It had been made a matter of international concern by the government of the Irish Republic which, after the publication of Compton's report and again after the deaths in Derry, had referred the whole question of Britain's methods in Northern Ireland to the Council of Europe, on the ground that they were a violation of the Human Rights Convention of which Britain was a signatory. By raising the matter in Washington, Sen. Edward Kennedy embarrassed and angered the British.

Heath was also convinced that "the control of law and order was a divisive issue in Northern Ireland" and should be taken out of politics for the time being. Brian Faulkner, the Stormont Premier, felt he could not agree to the complete transfer of security to Westminster, for what Heath had in mind was not merely the power to direct the army or to intern or release people deemed to be politically dangerous, but complete control of the Ulster police force, the judiciary, courts, prosecutions and prisons. This, Faulkner complained, would reduce Stormont to the level of an English county council. He rejected Heath's proposals and resigned on March 30, the day on which the British Parliament passed a law to make direct rule effective.

Some Unionists believed that Faulkner made a hasty blunder. Stormont, even with the transfer of security to Westminster, would have retained extensive powers over educational policy, industry and labor relations, health and social services, agriculture and economic development. Moreover, these Unionists argued, it would be better to have some sort of Parliament at Stormont than none.

His resignation was the last of the many serious mistakes that Faulkner had made during his twelve months in office. He became Prime Minister on March 23, 1971, upon the resignation of James Chichester-Clark, who had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

held the post since May 1969. From that day the situation in Northern Ireland rapidly worsened. Not only did the IRA intensify its campaign of terror but Faulkner's speeches became increasingly belligerent. He never mentioned rights or reform but made endless war propaganda against the Republicans and missed no opportunity, in disaster and distress, to castigate his enemies and critics. Three months after he became Premier the state of affairs in Northern Ireland was hopeless. And when Faulkner seized and interned more than 300 Republicans and their supporters in August 1971, the bombings, sabotage, loss of life and destruction of property began immediately to soar.

Within two days of internment, twenty-five people were shot dead, many others were seriously wounded; hundreds of Catholic homes were burned to ashes by Protestant militants; and 8,000 people again became refugees in their own country. In the seven months before internment ten British soldiers, two Ulster policemen and fifteen civilians were killed in the disturbances. During the four months following internment the death roll was thirty-two soldiers, ninety-eight civilians, nine policemen and five members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Since the beginning of the disturbances in August 1969 about 300 people have been killed; more than 200 of these deaths occurred during Faulkner's Premiership.

Edward Heath must have realized, soon after internment began, that Faulkner was a failure and a dangerous person to have in charge of Northern Ireland affairs. In October 1971 he appointed a Cabinet subcommittee to study all aspects of the Northern Ireland problem. In January 1972, when the negotiations on Britain's membership in the European Common Market were making satisfactory progress, he took personal responsibility for Northern Ireland. He might have done something about abolishing Stormont earlier than March had not the miners' strike in February demanded the full attention of his government.

One other consideration was the long-threatened Protestant backlash. Faulkner had stated many times that if Stormont were abolished and direct rule imposed from Westminster, nothing could contain the anger of the Protestants. Direct rule, he said, would be regarded as the first step toward the reunification of Ireland and could lead to civil war. No doubt he repeated this warning, or threat as it properly was, during his many meetings with Heath in London.

Meanwhile the Orange Order, led by a militant clergyman, Martin Smyth, compiled and issued a "covenant" in which they said they would resist direct rule, or any other changes in the constitution of Northern Ireland, by every means in their power. William Craig, a former Minister of Home Affairs at Stormont, organized a movement of Protestants which he called Ulster Vanguard, and threatened that if Stormont were abolished he would set up a Provisional Government and establish an "Independent British Ulster." Ulster Vanguard organized rallies during February and March. At the largest of these, held in Belfast only a few days before Heath announced his decision to impose direct rule, Craig told 70,000 members of his movement that they would have "to liquidate the enemies of Ulster" and that he was having dossiers compiled on IRA leaders and others who would have to be dealt with. On the other hand Ian Paisley, though he had been advising his followers during the autumn of 1971 that they should hold on to their guns in case they were called upon to resist changes in Ulster's constitution, seemed willing to accept Heath's plan and proposed that, if Stormont were not re-established at the end of the year's suspension, Northern Ireland should be "fully integrated" into the United Kingdom.

As it has turned out, there has been no Protestant backlash, no armed uprising of Unionists and Orangemen against Westminster. Ulster Vanguard, it is true, organized an impressive general strike on March 27 and 28. There were some incidents in which Craig's followers attacked isolated Catholic families or came into conflict with the British soldiers, but there was not the holocaust which Craig had forecast. Immediately after the general strike, many of those who took part began to worry about the loss of pay that they had suffered. Craig and Faulkner began bitterly to attack each other in public. And Paisley said that Stormont was gone forever.

No one believes that the suspension of Stormont, or even its abolition, is the final solution. Suspension may give William Whitelaw, who has been appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, time to extend civil rights and equality of opportunity to all, Catholics and Protestants. Equal rights could not apply as long as the Stormont administration existed and insured that the rights and privileges of Protestants were put before those of Catholics.

Equal rights may, as Whitelaw undoubtedly hopes, be seen to be effective within one year. The Catholics may, as Heath anticipates, repudiate violence and disassociate themselves from the IRA; but it will take more than one year to change the inherent attitudes of the Protestants and to allay their fears of being absorbed into what they imagine would be a Catholic-dominated united Ireland. The suspension of Stormont will, however, weaken the Unionist Party in the fifty-two constituencies that were represented in that Parliament; and, by eliminating the patronage which Stormont dispensed, it will weaken the influence of the Orange Order. Political activity, with Stormont out of the way, will center on the twelve seats which Northern Ireland holds in the British Parliament. And if Stormont is not reconstituted, there will be a case for increasing the number of Northern Ireland M.P.s at Westminster, possibly to twenty. The Unionists might finally settle for that. Faulkner, indeed, has hinted that they will.

What, however, will be the attitude of the IRA, split as it is into two antagonistic factions since the autumn of 1969? The Provisional IRA, which Sean MacStiophain leads and which has been responsible for most of the guerrilla fighting of the past eighteen months, had the abolition of Stormont among its first demands, but only as a step toward the withdrawal of all British troops from Northern Ireland and the reunification of the country. The official IRA, with its declared socialistic bias, believed that Stormont should have remained, on the ground that any Irish government is better than British

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rule. The officials argued that Stormont could have been reformed without being abolished and that direct rule, along with the appointment of William Whitelaw as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, is really a step backward to the Act of Union which in 1800 abolished the Irish Parliament and put all Ireland under the direct rule of Westminster. That experiment in government was undeniably disastrous. It led to the tragedies of the great famine in the 1840s, to the emigration of half the Irish nation, to economic decline, stagnation and revolution.

So, in actual fact, the future of Northern Ireland, with or without its own local Parliament, remains the central issue. Paisley, Faulkner and a growing body of Unionists would accept complete integration with the United Kingdom as their best safeguard. The Irish Republicans and the Catholics' representatives in the Social Democratic and Labour Party say that reunification of Ireland is the only final solution. □

ARMS BUDGET

THE PENTAGON STOKES INFLATION

RICHARD F. KAUFMAN

Mr. Kaufman is on the staff of the Joint Economic Committee. He is the author of The War Profiteers *(Bobbs-Merrill and Doubleday-Anchor).*

Thanks to Congress, and no thanks to the Executive, defense spending has declined substantially since the peak of fighting was reached in Vietnam a few years ago. However, a peacetime economy is still remote and efforts to get anywhere near such a state, or even to cut the defense budget further, will now become much more difficult, for at least two reasons. First, it has thus far been possible to cut spending without changing the basic military force structure or our ability to meet international commitments. Any further reductions would entail alterations in forces and commitments. Second, institutional resistance to any more cuts in the defense budget has stiffened, and extra-military influence on defense decision making is beginning to emerge again. The Administration's current proposal to increase the defense budget sharply—to return to what Defense Comptroller Robert C. Moot calls "a defense buildup situation"—may indicate that the military-industrial complex, after enduring three years of political storms, believes there is smooth sailing ahead.

Since Congress began its serious scrutiny of defense requests in 1969, it has appropriated significantly less than was requested by the Executive. In fiscal 1970 and 1971, it cut $9 billion from requests for the budget category of "National Defense" and, as of this writing, has removed $3.5 billion from the 1972 request (fiscal 1972 ends on June 30). However, more than $2 billion is still pending in supplemental requests, most of it to cover pay raises enacted last year. If the extraordinary pay raises given the military and civilian employees of the Defense Department were excluded, the Congressional cuts would appear as a larger percentage of the requests.

The Pentagon complains bitterly and often about the effects of pay boosts and inflation on the defense dollar. Omitted from the Pentagon's calculations is the extent that its own spending and actions contribute to price increases. Under the best circumstances, defense spending is an inflationary activity because, in general, it involves nonproductive uses of resources and high opportunity costs. Economists have attributed much of the inflationary psychology among consumers to the war in Vietnam. The way the Pentagon spends public funds—on unnecessary cost overruns and other forms of waste—has made it a fast breeder of high prices.

Rising manpower costs do give some credence to the argument that defense dollars do not buy as much as they once did. Secretary Melvin R. Laird says in the posture statement that military average basic pay rates have more than doubled since 1964, while average civilian salaries grew by 70 per cent. Total pay and related outlays went up from $32.6 billion in 1968 to $40.4 billion in the current fiscal year. During the same period the number of military personnel dropped from 3.5 million to 2.4 million. That is a real reduction in the size of the military establishment; there are now about as many men in uniform as there were before the Vietnamese buildup.

But one should be skeptical when the Pentagon cries poverty. If the defense dollar has shrunk, the cause in large measure is extravagance and mismanagement throughout the military establishment. The case has been documented too extensively to bear repetition here.

Most of the budget reductions can be attributed to de-escalation of the U.S. role in the ground war in Vietnam and to a slowdown in weapons procurement. Incremental spending for the war (defined as the amount over and above what the United States would spend in Southeast Asia if there were no war) has declined from $20 billion in 1968 to about $7 billion in the current year. The savings come principally from troop withdrawals. If troop levels, now at around 100,000, go down to 30,000 by the end of this year, the cost of the war could be about $3.5 billion in 1973, assuming that we are being told the truth about the costs of the air war. But whether the war really does end or a Korean type of settlement prolongs the agony, the fact is that the major dollar benefits of winding it down have already been received. Spending for Vietnam cannot go below zero and it could hover for an indefinite period at $2 billion a year in military assistance alone. After next year there is likely to be little budgetary room for maneuver with regard to the war.

Procurement outlays, meanwhile, have declined from

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$31 billion in 1968 to $26 billion, reflecting a dip in defense contract awards and the stretching out of several weapons programs. But the dip was not designed to be very deep or long lasting. Thus, the difficulty of making further cuts in overall spending becomes clear: potential future savings from Vietnam have diminished, while decisions to authorize or accelerate new weapons programs are already being felt in rising procurement costs. Had manpower not been pared down, reductions in the budget might not have been realized at all.

The procurement crisis has been coming for several years and many observers have predicted that hopes for a lower budget would vanish unless the weapons dream list was culled. Congress, unfortunately, has not succeeded in turning down the more questionable and expensive programs. This year the Administration proposes huge increases in research and development, shipbuilding and a variety of conventional and strategic arms: $300 million for a new nuclear carrier that may end up costing $1 billion; $735 million for the F-14 and $910 million for the F-15 fighter aircraft; $260 million for a fleet of jetliners (747s have been mentioned) for Presidential airborne command posts in a nuclear emergency; and about $5 billion for Safeguard ABM, the conversion of Minuteman III and Polaris/Poseidon to MIRV, the AWACS bomber defense program, the B-1 bomber and ULMS, the new submarine missile system—six strategic programs of dubious immediate necessity.

The strategic programs are probably the most vulnerable to logical and practical analysis. They will increase our present strategic lead over the Soviet Union and decrease our real national security, as the Russians strive to catch up. As procurement costs climb, pressures to enlarge the total budget are bound to intensify.

Manpower costs will also surely continue to rise unless troop levels are further reduced. New pay raises can be anticipated as the military moves toward an all-volunteer army. More than $4 billion is earmarked in the new budget for pay raises recently enacted. Other related costs promise to expand to unprecedented proportions. Retirement pay alone now amounts to $4 billion per year, almost twice the amount spent in 1968, and it may go to $5 billion next year.

With the forces in Vietnam already far reduced, prospects for additional manpower cuts are not good unless the force structure is materially changed. Most of the costs of defense go for conventional forces and the largest chunk is allocated to our NATO commitment. The struggle over the Mansfield amendment and other proposals to withdraw part of the U.S. forces in Europe is critical to the whole question of defense spending.

One line of thinking is that a drastic restructuring of U.S. NATO forces will be necessary if troop strength is to drop much below the present number. In other words, reducing our NATO commitment would open the way to cut total U.S. troop levels and defense costs. About $25 billion annually, or more than half the costs of all our conventional forces, excluding Vietnam, is spent for what are known as "European contingencies." All the manpower reductions that have been made so far came out of Asia. The implications of a decision to reduce military manpower and return more of the responsibility for defending Europe to the Europeans could be enormous.

Extra-military considerations such as the political, diplomatic and economic needs of government decision makers contribute inordinately to enlarging the defense budget and the force structure it supports. There is nothing new in this. Military planning has always proceeded on a mixture of pure and impure motives, obvious requirements for self-defense being thrown in the basket with irrational fears and unspoken and sometimes furtive desires to influence the course of world events and domestic affairs—not to mention bureaucratic and corporate empire building. The only novelty these days is that the purported military justifications for major new programs are so blatantly inadequate and unrelated to military needs.

A long-standing Pentagon argument for increased budgets is that we must "match" or stay ahead of the Soviet Union in every important respect. Accordingly, new "threats," some real, some fanciful, are periodically discovered and put forth in support of proposed responses on our part. But in an age of nuclear overkill it does not always follow that we must have everything they have, and more. It may or may not make military sense for us to invest in a new weapon simply because of what the Russians are doing. We often misinterpret what they are doing and spend vast sums on faulty premises. We began putting MIRV in Polaris because of an alleged threat that the Russians were building a massive ABM. It has not been built, but now, somehow, we can't stop MIRVing.

The United States and Russia have different physical territories, resources and economic capabilities. Our relationships with our respective allies and their military capabilities are not at all alike. We share no boundary with an unfriendly nation; the Soviet Union does and it has had to divert a large part of its forces to the Chinese border. The Russians apparently feel no compulsion to match us item for item, nor should they. They have not built a carrier fleet and they have allowed their long-range bomber force to deteriorate. What they do militarily may not represent a real threat to our ability to defend ourselves or to our nuclear deterrent. It may be reasonable for world powers to want parity in some areas, but across-the-board matching is foolish, impossible and no answer to the question of national security.

Several identifiable extra-military justifications follow from the matching argument. One is the "bargaining chip" argument. Under it, a major program is said to be required in part to gain an advantage over an adversary with which we are negotiating. Safeguard is viewed less as a prophylactic device for our land-based missiles or as a defense against China than as a bargaining chip in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. The idea is that if we continue pouring billions into Safeguard, the Russians will be more likely to agree to a mutual cessation of ABM programs. The often repeated need to "deal from a position of strength" is kissing cousin to the bargaining chip. Like matching, both break down because the opponent in the game is driven to adopt the same behavior.

Another derivation of matching amounts to a challenge that the Soviet Union play nuclear chicken with us. Here the argument is that, since the Russians understand the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

language of force better than that of reason, the only way to show them we mean business is to steer a collision course with Armageddon. This year's nearly $1 billion request for ULMS falls into that category.

Secretary Laird says in the posture statement that we need ULMS in order to "signal to the Soviets and our allies that we have the will and the resources to maintain sufficient strategic forces in the face of a growing Soviet threat." As Sen. J. William Fulbright points out in a speech given February 18, this is an unusual approach to military analysis. The case is not made that Polaris/Poseidon, widely conceded to be invulnerable for the foreseeable future, is threatened. Nor is there a showing that our overall deterrent power is in imminent danger of being weakened. We are concerned because the Russians are also building Polaris-type submarines and therefore, Secretary Laird goes on to say, he has "carefully reviewed all alternatives for a new strategic initiative" and has chosen ULMS because it has the best long-term prospect for survivability.

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elaborated on Laird's statement in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Said Moorer: "We will pay a very high price in the effectiveness of our diplomacy if we permit the Soviet Union to achieve a clearly evident strategic superiority, even if that superiority would achieve no practical effect on the outcome of an all-out nuclear exchange." The Pentagon seems to be saying that we must enhance our strategic forces with a major new initiative—any major new initiative—to persuade the Russians that we intend to stay ahead of them regardless of cost. Laird says we want to convince them we will maintain "sufficient" strategic forces, but we are ahead now and our lead is increasing. Admiral Moorer's explicit reference to diplomacy and his admission that even Russian strategic superiority would not affect the outcome of a nuclear war, reinforces the conclusion that the motives behind the push being given to ULMS have little to do with traditional military requirements.

Huffaker, News & Obeserver (Raleigh)

We are doing what used to be called saber rattling, except that now the sabers cost billions and threaten our own security as much as they do anyone else's. In any event, questions about the wisdom of Safeguard and ULMS aside, the overriding fact for purposes of this discussion is that decisions to go forward with those budget bulgers have been profoundly influenced by international extra-military considerations. ULMS may not be the first time a major nuclear initiative has been taken because of a political and diplomatic threat rather than because of a military threat, but it is the first time we haven't bothered to offer a better excuse.

Here at home another group of influences, equally remote from strict military requirements, are causing decision makers to agree to defense increases. The pattern, in this semi-post-Vietnam era, began to reveal itself in 1970. Throughout the first part of that year there were many indications from official sources that the Administration planned a substantial cut in military spending. Around September, some hedging took place on the size of the cuts. It is believed that stiff opposition from the Pentagon led White House proponents of defense reductions to back down. Then, a few weeks after the Congressional elections, the unofficial policy was completely reversed. From then on the recession and the high rate of unemployment were seen as more important to the voter than his alleged concern over campus unrest, permissiveness and radical-liberalism. The budget submitted to Congress the following January contained a large increase for defense rather than the much-heralded reduction. The connection between the election returns and defense policy became apparent to many observers.

At the Office of Management and Budget, where defense requests are supposed to be reviewed before final decisions are made by the President, several career budget examiners resigned in disgust from the national security division. Sen. William Proxmire asked OMB director George P. Shultz, during last year's Joint Economic Committee hearings on the state of the economy, whether stepped-up defense spending was planned for military reasons or to support an expansionary fiscal policy. Shultz denied the implicit accusation, but would not deny that he had recommended a much lower defense budget than the one officially proposed by the President. "The whole internal mechanism," said Shultz, "of who recommended what and whatnot is something that I cannot talk about."

Government spokesmen, including Shultz, have since had quite a lot to say about what happens to the economy when defense spending slows down. In this year's budget message, President Nixon decries the fact that "Congress cut my appropriations request" for defense last year and the year before. The annual economic report may go far to explain why the cuts so upset him. There the President says that the unemployment problem was "intensified by the reduction of over 2 million defense-related jobs." Almost all of the President's economic advisers have been echoing this line for many months. The economy's poor

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

performance, especially the unemployment rate, has been blamed on military cutbacks. Treasury Secretary John Connally, hammering on this point, has gone so far as to suggest that historically the United States has not been able to achieve full employment without the stimulus of military spending.

Such assertions have revived fears that the defense budget is being used to prop up the economy, to the amusement of the critics of American capitalism. Former Presidential adviser Arthur Okun has accused the Administration of "deliberately and consciously" using the defense cutback as a vehicle of fiscal restraint, thereby increasing unemployment in order to fight inflation. Okun, and many economists, maintain that the government could have taken steps to offset the effect of defense reductions on employment. Higher unemployment, in other words, was part of the economic game plan. There is good reason to believe that the new round of military increases is now being used, among other purposes, to force the unemployment rate down.

What does all this say about the nature of the economic system? Michael Reich, an economist at Boston University, asserts in a paper presented last December to the annual meeting of the American Economic Association that the U.S. economy, while not inherently militaristic, is more *likely* to turn to military than to social spending to solve the chronic problems of inadequate demand and unsatisfactory growth. Military spending is highly profitable to defense contractors, many of whom are among the largest industrial corporations in the nation. Social services spending is unlikely to be as profitable or expandable. Military spending does not compete with the private market. Social services spending, say for low-income housing or mass transit, is seen as a threat by the housing and automobile industries.

Industry also worries, Reich argues, that government spending for such things as an adequate welfare program would cause workers to drop out of the labor market, and that a government-supported free universal education system extending through college would undermine the class structure. Military spending does not upset the labor market, does not threaten the class structure, is acceptable to all corporate interests, and is unopposed by any strong interest group. Whether or not one subscribes to Reich's analysis, it is hardly deniable that economic and other extra-military considerations are this year exerting more than usual pressure upon the defense program.

Foremost among the factors tending to counteract the kinds of pressures I have described, and perhaps the last hope for major reform, is the movement within Congress to challenge the Pentagon's budget and the underlying assumptions on which it is built. The attempt so far has had limited success—principally a military rollback smaller than many would have liked to see. But there has been enough motion in the direction in which the critics want to go to have made the struggle worth while and to encourage them to continue.

Looking back over the past three years, charges of waste and mismanagement in defense contracting, gold-plating of weapons systems, redundancy and "fat" throughout the military establishment, overcommitment of United States forces around the world, and Pentagon concealment and deception have held up. In my judgment, most of the specific arguments against such programs as Safeguard, C-5A, F-14, Main Battle Tank, Cheyenne Helicopter, B-1 bomber and the forces allocated to NATO, to name a few, are sounder than those put forward on their behalf by the military. That in itself is no small accomplishment; it debunks the notion that most of the competence and resources for analyzing the defense program are within the Pentagon. Congressional understanding and ability to deal with the whole range of national security issues has greatly improved, and former Pentagon officials and other experts are much more willing than they once were to offer advice and counsel. The fact that the critics have often been defeated with inferior arguments in showdown votes in the House and Senate means that there may be absolute limits to rational analysis in a political forum. The outcome of this year's debate could determine whether those limits have been reached. □

WINNERS AND LOSERS

THE DIVIDED WORKING CLASS

ANDREW LEVISON
Mr. Levison is a research associate with the Institute for Non-violent Social Change.

After twenty years of almost complete inattention, the position of the working class within American society came up for reconsideration in the months following the 1970 election. The Nixon recession focused attention on the real economic discontents of the working class, while their political behavior in the by-election weakened the wildly distorted image of labor as composed entirely of hard-hatted storm troopers. The previously heretical notion that working people might have legitimate discontents began to find its way into not only the liberal press but the pages of *Newsweek* and *Time*.

However, while only a year has passed, the outlines of a new mythology have already developed. It is the social stereotype of the worker as the confused and angry Middle American; the frightened man perched midway between affluence and poverty, fearful of losing his newly acquired status and standard of living. At the risk of a slight oversimplification, it is the myth of Archie Bunker as the typical worker.

The psychological characterization of Archie, while

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

still imbued with middle-class condescension, is probably an improvement on the literally demonic image of the "hard-hat" which preceded it. But, Archie as the sociologically average blue collarite is a stereotype in a certain sense as false as that of the affluent worker, and its implications could be equally damaging to any attempt to break the current impasse between progressives and labor.

The crux of the issue is that Archie Bunker, a foreman making about $10,000 a year and living in a semi-stable working-class suburb, by no means represents the Ameri-

can working class as a whole. When the range of working-class life styles, from the poorest to the most affluent, is considered, the image of Archie conceals the fact that workers are divided into two quite different groups.

One can properly be placed midway between affluence and poverty. It constitutes a distinct subculture of predominantly suburban, more highly skilled workers whose family incomes range from $10,500 to $13,000-plus a year. For such workers this standard of living, in a semi-suburban environment relatively free of crime and other urban problems, adds up to a stable working-class life style. It is by no means affluence or middle-class life, and its members still suffer a very real deprivation in terms of the American dream. But they have achieved a precarious level of comfort and security, at least from day to day [see Levison: "The Working-Class Majority," *The Nation*, December 13, 1971].

This group has become the popular image of the working class, both because of the wide attention construction workers received during their conflicts with students and blacks, and because the familiarity of most middle-class people with the economic conditions of labor begins and ends with a horrified glance at the plumber's bill. The popular conception of blue-collar workers as the "Middle Americans," more concerned with social issues than with economic discontent, arises from an almost exclusive focus on this group.

But within the working class is another group whose life style and economic circumstances show little similarity to the image of the Middle American. This group is concentrated either in urban ethnic enclaves, often decaying and crime infested, or in drab working-class districts located near factories. Its members are employed in the least skilled jobs and their income puts them far closer to poverty than to affluence. It is a culture foreign to middle-class America, the culture of the garbage collectors, janitors and municipal service workers in the cities and the floor-sweepers and unskilled assembly line workers in the factories. While a disproportionate number of blacks and other racial minorities are concentrated in this group, it is nonetheless mostly white.

The life style and economic condition of these workers are those associated with the classical proletariat. Many of them are without savings or significant possessions and are employed in the most boring, dirty, arduous and often dangerous jobs in the society. Their situation amounts literally to a daily struggle for existence.

While few would dispute that such a culture exists, the key question in evaluating its potential political importance is its size, both in relation to the rest of the working class and to American society as a whole. It is here that the popular image and the reality are most at odds. In contrast to the common wisdom which equates the working class with the stable, suburban worker, this second group is not some tiny fringe, composed mostly of minorities, but represents a *third to a half* of the working class. That assertion, however disrupting of widely held assumptions, emerges unmistakably from the available data on income and occupation in the United States. It raises the possibility that the social and economic discontents of labor, which statistics show are far greater than generally realized, may still be a potent force for change.

The widely popularized statistics which portray most workers as near-affluent are the result of a carefully nurtured confusion about the terms "blue collar," "Middle American" and "working class."

The common-sense understanding of the terms "working class" is manual workers, those who do essentially physical labor, as opposed to professional or managerial work. It embraces four occupational categories; craftsmen and foremen, operatives, service workers and laborers. (It also includes two smaller groups, farm laborers and a certain percentage of clerical workers who do basically manual work. However, there are no specific data on either of these.)

As the question at issue is the political implications to be derived from the economic conditions of the working class, it would seem logical to examine the entire range of working-class occupations. Instead, the many analyses which offer a figure of about $10,500 as the average family income for workers, are invariably limited to white, married, skilled workers and operatives. Occasionally ingenious variations are used, as, for example, including the laborers but stipulating year-round, full-time employment. Since this approach eliminates laborers and service workers, black workers and sometimes all unemployed workers, it is not surprising that the result is misleading.

When the whole spectrum of the working class is considered, the real proportions of the so-called Middle Americans and severely deprived workers becomes apparent. The situation in terms of income can be seen in the chart on column one, following page.

Almost 40 per cent of the working class made less than $8,000 a year. About 30 per cent made less than $7,000. This means that for 40 per cent of the working class the total family income before taxes was less than $153 a week; for about a third it was less than $135. It is easy to grasp that these figures indicate severe deprivation, but if one accepts the Bureau of Labor Statistics' intermediate budget, which reflects not affluence but simply a stable working-class life, the proportion of deprived

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workers is even greater. For 1970, it was estimated that an average family needed $10,664 for a stable middle-income level of consumption. By this criterion, 60 per cent of working-class families were below the Middle American level, with 50 per cent falling at least $1,000 short.

The point is clear—almost half the working class must be defined as suffering severe deprivation, not merely in relation to middle-class affluence, which 80 to 85 per cent of the working class does not achieve but even in relation to the middle-income culture which the popular analyses suggest is "working-class life."

The highly sympathetic analyses which describe the discontents of the forgotten Americans in terms of their struggle to send their children to college, to save enough money for retirement and to have savings in case of illness are valid for some workers, but for almost half the working class, such things as college and meaningful savings are utterly unreal. Even the very modest standard of living symbolized by Archie and the middle-income budget is out of their grasp. The 40 per cent making less than $8,000 a year are caught in a life style that was supposed to have disappeared twenty years ago, the culture of working-class poverty.

WORKING-CLASS FAMILY INCOME
(craftsmen and foremen, operatives, service and laborers)

Income In 1,000s	%	% of all working-class families below this level
0-7	29.5	29.5
7-8	8.1	37.6
		40% severely deprived
8-9	8.6	46.2
9-10	8.3	54.5
		50% $1,000 below intermediate
10-12	14.9	69.4
12-15	15.0	84.4
		85-88% below affluence
15+	15.6	100.0

From Current Population Reports, Consumer Income Series, p. 60, No. 79.

It must be noted that the income levels here discussed are before taxes. They are also the income of the entire family, working wives and overtime included. Moreover, these families do not include the very lowest levels of American society—welfare clients, those out of the labor force from choice, illness or advancing age, and the long-term unemployed are all excluded. The figures describe only the *working* poor; if poverty in general were considered, the average would be substantially lower.

While the statistics on income are fairly straightforward, data on other key aspects of the condition of the working class, the nature of their jobs and the kind of neighborhoods they live in, are not directly available.

Some idea of the proportion of the skilled trades to the more dull and alienating unskilled ones can be seen in the following table. It is approximately correct to identify laborers and service workers with the unskilled, and operatives with the semi-skilled. However, as the operative category contains the bulk of the factory jobs, such as assembly line work, it is probably more accurate to treat this category as split into two distinct kinds of jobs, the basically skilled and the basically unskilled.

WORKING-CLASS OCCUPATIONS AND EARNINGS 1970

Occupational category	% of the working class	Average income of full-time male	Unemployment rate
Craftsmen & foremen	27	$9,253	3.8
Operatives	37	7,664	7.1
Laborers	9.6	6,462	9.5
Service workers	26	6,964	5.3

From the Manpower Report of the President 1970 and Department of Commerce, Current Population Reports. Consumer Income Series, p. 60, No. 78.

A somewhat more precise view can be obtained from data on specific occupations. An approximate sorting into skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled suggests that clearly unskilled jobs constitute about a third of all working-class employment, and if one includes typical assembly line work the figure rises to about half. Although these figures are from the 1960 census, there has been no basic change in the relative size of the four occupational categories since then. Thus, in contrast to the popular image of the overpaid craftsman, millions of workers, from a third to half the total, remain in the unskilled or slightly skilled occupations. That the conditions under which such jobs are performed are a source of discontent is recognized by even the most optimistic writers.

Finally, with regard to the stereotype of the suburban worker, the census data seem at first glance to be straightforward—13 million workers live in the suburbs and 10 million in the cities. However, in addition to the fact that the 10 million urban workers constitute 44 per cent of the total, the issue is further complicated by two factors. First, the "suburbs" of the census bureau, especially in the industrialized East and Midwest, often include entire towns and small cities. Arthur Shostak, in his *Blue Collar Life*, estimates that in 1969 a little more than half the working class lived in fundamentally urban neighborhoods, and a sizable group of them in decaying, high-crime areas.

In addition, while the word "suburbs" brings to mind tree-lined streets and clean air, many working-class suburbs are in fact densely packed rows of identical cottages, often close to large factories. While these homes represent a status higher than a tenement flat, it is wrong to equate them with middle-class suburbs. Nothing illustrates the social gap between the two more forcefully than the fact that in certain working-class suburbs a shift of wind periodically deposits a film of soot on the lawns, turning the grass a rusty brown.

It should also be noted that the trend is actually away from home ownership for the working class. Writing in *Transaction*, George Sternlieb notes that "private conventional housing in the Northeast has substantially dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

appeared at anything under the $25,000 mark." And further that fully 90 per cent of the one-family houses built for less than $15,000 in 1971 were mobile homes. He concludes that "the new private home may be the dream of blue-collar America; its reality, however, is slipping away."

Since the myth of the average worker as a Middle American Archie is wrong, the political conclusions that have been deduced from it are a crucial stumbling block in developing any rational strategy for social change. The popular analysis suggests that since the working class is, in its words, "doing all right" economically, its discontent is based on psychological factors; fear and hostility toward blacks; a sense of being ignored by the society; the challenge to old-fashioned values of work and family presented by the hippies, and so on. Even the liberal analysts, who add the economic pressures and insecurity that distinguish the middle-income from the middle-class life styles, nevertheless fall back on an essentially psychological explanation for the discontent of the working class. Its members are deprived, but it is only relative deprivation.

There are two practical implications of this view: it tends to downgrade the economic deprivation of workers to an issue of minor significance, and it provides a superficial sociological basis for assuming that workers are inherently reactionary. It suggests that there are no real issues on which black and white workers could find a basis for cooperation and political alliance, since the Middle American worker finds his neighborhood, his job and his standard of living threatened by black advancement, while his own cultural and psychological discontents are ignored.

But the premise that the basic social and economic grievances of working-class life no longer have any meaning for workers is contradicted by the basic socio-economic data, and also by political events within labor which the Middle American cliché conveniently ignores.

The idea that the economic discontents of the working class are somehow less pressing than the social and political complaints will not stand up. In 1970, many more than 3 million workers were involved in strikes, despite the high level of unemployment. That is the largest number of workers involved in work stoppages since the Korean War, and not since 1946 have so many different workers gone on strike for so long. When combined with the new kind of militancy and aggressiveness shown in strikes, as with the postal workers, the Bell Telephone workers and the municipal workers, it is from a purely numerical point of view a most profound and active expression of working-class discontent.

In addition, an assertive hostility is growing, especially among young workers, toward the basic conditions of factory work. That was recently made apparent when production in a key GM plant was disrupted by workers protesting the pace and amount of work. While this issue has received up to now only passing mention in the press, the discontent is widespread and has provoked a sudden interest in "job enrichment." [See "Time-Study Coercion: The Men Won't Toe the Vega Line" by B. J. Widick, *The Nation*, March 27.]

It is important to note that the severely deprived workers are in the forefront of this movement. The young, the blacks and the unskilled workers are the base of the rank-and-file rebellion that has sent union leaders back to management with rejected contracts, and prompted them to react as strongly as they did to the inequities of the wage-price freeze. It is fair to say that, especially among the lower half of the working class, the class issue, not Scammon's social issue, is still the focal point of active discontent.

The second political conclusion of the popular wisdom —that black and white workers have completely opposed interests—really flows from the first notion, that the basic social and economic discontents of the working class no longer exist. This leads to the image of blacks as a discontented "underclass," pitted against the satisfied Middle American worker.

While obviously a whole range of conflicts and inequalities does exist between the races, there is a profound difference between viewing it as competition between groups of workers within the framework of similar basic discontents, and elevating it to a clash between groups whose interests are fundamentally opposed. It is almost too obvious to state that, while black and white workers compete for jobs, and are in conflict over such issues as promotion and shift allotment, they have common interests in guaranteed employment, higher wages, job safety, speedup, and reform of the tax structure. Even the explosive issues of open housing and school integration provide areas of long-range mutual need, such as a solution to the current national housing crisis and improvement of the schools to provide the basis for better jobs. The urban, poor workers, in particular, often do not have racially homogeneous schools or neighborhoods to protect. Instead, they feel the whole range of grievances with the conditions of city life. Clearly, there are real and pressing issues on which working-class blacks and whites can unite, if the current impasse can be to some degree overcome.

That leads to the last issue—the middle-class preconception, bolstered by the Middle American myth, that the working class is inevitably predisposed to reactionary politics. In this regard the outburst in Forest Hills over public housing, while tragic, demonstrated a point black leaders have been making for some time—that the middle class's greater "tolerance" is in large part a result of having a lot less to tolerate. That middle-class protest against public housing is a dramatic demonstration of the fact that the working class has no monopoly on self-interest or racism.

However, at this time there is no doubt that the relationship between black and white workers is tense and hostile. Nor can the political trend indicated by Pontiac and the building trades be ignored. But when one looks at situations where the common economic deprivation provides the basis for alliance, there are signs of hope. In recent UAW elections, blacks have replaced older whites, often with the strong support of young white workers, who see the blacks as more militant and more willing to stand up to the company. In Mississippi, critically poor white woodcutters, some of them former Klan members,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

worked with Charles Evers and the NAACP. Some of them subsequently voted for him in the election. White steelworkers in South Dakota asked the Southern Christian Leadership Conference for aid during a strike. Other labor struggles, such as the campaign to organize farm workers in Florida, have also provided examples of interracial unity, even in the face of conscious splitting tactics by management.

This new mood is not confined to factory issues. A recent national conference on housing brought together 1,600 white, black and brown representatives of ethnic groups from every large city. [See "Coalition Against 'Blockbusting'" by Fred Barbash, *The Nation,* April 17.] The delegates from the predominantly working-class neighborhoods steered clear of racial confrontation and identified institutions, not one another, as the enemy. The FHA, real estate companies and other business interests were all cited as the "real" villains in urban decay. Finally, the struggle to open the suburbs to decent working-class housing, regardless of race, has already brought union and civil rights lawyers into joint actions.

Although events like these are the exception, the growth of any movement along such lines has been trapped in a vicious circle. Accepting the myth that all workers are Middle Americans, the liberal progressive forces have never seriously considered developing a political program based on the needs of the severely deprived. Instead, the needs of working people, black and white, have been consistently ignored in favor of paper coalitions of the most wildly disparate groups and issues.

In essence, the Archie myth is the latest in a series of distortions about the working class which has isolated liberals from what is perhaps the crucial struggle of the decade. When Robert Kennedy won in districts previously ceded to George Wallace, it was an indication that workers, while deeply discontented, were not inherently reactionary. In the four years since then, opportunity after opportunity has been missed to respond to the basic grievances of the working class, the grievances of near poverty and dehumanization. It would be tragic if the myth of the middle-income worker and its logical corollary, the reactionary worker, were proved true—not because it was initially correct but because demoralized liberals and progressives failed to see the error. □

FLORIDA—FOR SALE AGAIN

ITT SUBDIVIDES PARADISE

MICHAEL F. TONER
Mr. Toner is the environmental writer for the Miami Herald.

Miami

North Florida's lush Atlantic Coast has been ruled by a variety of powers during the last several centuries—the Seminoles, the Spanish, the French, the British and, now, by the International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. The region's latest landlord has staked out a vast 100,000-acre expanse between St. Augustine and Daytona Beach, some of the last unspoiled coastline in the state, for its first venture into the business of land sales and city building.

The conglomerate's avowed goal is "a city the size of Philadelphia with the density of Beverly Hills," a sprawling ITTown of 750,000 people, with a handful of ITT subsidiaries to plan, sell and service it. The corporate fathers of the new city have promised that it will be totally planned and environmentally sound—chiefly because ITT has the resources and what its officials call the "enlightened leadership" to build it that way. But planned city or not, ITT is changing forever the face of Florida's little Flagler County, and not all of the area's 4,454 residents are enthusiastic about the prospect of another Philadelphia on their doorsteps—even in a part of Florida where hucksters have been halfheartedly peddling Florida land to Northerners since 1908.

However, any coolness toward its new city of Palm Coast is not shared by ITT's top-level management. The reason is apparent: ITT paid an estimated $10 million for its Florida lands and, in the first year and a half of operation, ITT Community Development has chalked up more than $55 million in sales under contract. Not even last year's controversial antitrust settlement with the U.S. Justice Department interfered with ITT's plans to turn a profit on Palm Coast.

Until June 1971, Palm Coast was a project of Levitt Community Development, a subsidiary of ITT Levitt and Sons, one of the nation's largest home builders and creators of the look-alike tract homes that have become synonymous with the stereotype of modern suburbia. Then, one month before ITT chose to divest itself of Levitt, and while the settlement was still being negotiated with the Justice Department, the Palm Coast property and all of its personnel were quietly shifted out of the Levitt subsidiary.

The result was ITT Community Development Corp.—a company with the same property, the same people and the same plans to build a city of 750,000 in North Florida—and a Levitt and Sons shrunk to about half its former sales potential. "We were the gem," explains former Levitt executive Norman Young, now president of the new corporation, who says he "can't remember" when the company he heads was created.

Officials of the Justice Department's antitrust division say that the transfer was carried out with the "full knowledge" of the government and actually took place on June 29, 1971. The government, however, made no mention of the move in its July 31st announcement of the settlement and ITT did not report the change to either the Securities and Exchange Commission or to its stockholders. The first formal appearance of ITT Community Development came a full six weeks after the settlement, when

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ITT changed the name of its former Levitt subsidiary in the state of Delaware's corporation records.

Since then, ITT has made at least one thing clear. Whether or not it is serious about creating a totally planned new city in the Florida boondocks, it is at least serious about selling it. Even in a state where sight-unseen, installment land sales are a tradition, ITT's operations may provide a whole new chapter in the history of the selling of Florida. More than half of Community Development's 800 employees are salesmen, and by the company's own estimates there are more people selling the city than there are building it.

Young, a former dance hall bouncer, New York ad man and Ph.D. in psychology, estimates that ITT is spending more than $5 million a year to promote and sell Palm Coast. That's more than twice the combined annual budgets of the government of Flagler County, its municipalities and its school system. But, Young says, the 12,000 homesites ITT has sold so far have only scratched the surface. By the time there are offices in every major Northern city, Europe and Latin America, the company expects to turn over a total of 200,000 units.

Despite the volume of its sales, ITT's basic pitch is as old as the days of Florida's earliest land booms, when speculators offered 25 acres of Florida paradise for $5 down and $5 a month. ITT has added some polish to the well-tested spiel, but it still offers the "chance of a lifetime to purchase land in Florida for investment, retirement, or vacation."



ITT Levitt Development Corp.

In every other Florida development, that approach has enabled the state's big landowners to sell wet, barren lots in the middle of nowhere to Northern residents and servicemen overseas, who seldom turn up to occupy their property. Some things, however, have changed since the days of the first land booms. Instead of $5 down, it's now $500. Instead of 25 acres, it's now an 80x120-foot lot.

Some things haven't changed. Most of the land for sale needs drainage, a lot of drainage. ITT's prospects are told that, because these days Florida law requires it. They aren't told how much the drainage is likely to cost, since Florida law doesn't go that far.

The cost of drainage will be determined by one of ITT's own creations, a special taxing district called the Atlantis Water Management District. Under an antiquated 1913 State law, the major landowners of an area may be authorized to tax fellow landowners for any desired drainage works. Since the district's major landowners are ITT Community Development, its sister corporation ITT Rayonier and their subsidiaries, ITT will actually have—indirectly, of course—the power to tax. ITT officials will be able to decide just what drainage works are "desirable," how much to tax to get the job done, and how the taxes are to be distributed among what will be a growing number of powerless, individual homeowners.

In fact, even from the sketchy plans that ITT already has for its prized Florida possessions, it is clear that the corporation is not building just another planned community on a grandiose scale. ITT is building a company town—no, a company city—of the future. ITT will provide its own water and sewer service for the residents of Palm Coast, complete with advanced waste treatment and a subsidiary, Atlantis Development Corp., to handle the job. ITT will retain the timber rights to more than 60 per cent of the thickly forested lands, chiefly through its Rayonier subsidiary, which operates a pulp mill north of Jacksonville. ITT will also maintain the labyrinthine canals system that it is creating—and pass on the costs of maintenance to homeowners—through the water management district. ITT even offers, at least temporarily, its own armed, deputized police force of Pinkerton guards, whose ITT-furnished patrol cars are tied into the Flagler County sheriff's radio system.

ITT may even be going into the garbage-collection business, although Community Development's officials have had trouble finding a way to make the operation profitable and have maintained a firm stand that "that's a county problem."

ITT Sheraton is an odds-on favorite to become the first hotel on the county's pink sand beaches, where several Community Development "straw companies" own nearly 6 miles of unspoiled shoreline. And, although Palm Coast's developers say they want to encourage "architectural diversity" to prevent the look-alike monotony of another Levittown, any house that isn't included among the seventeen models the company now offers will have to be approved by an architectural committee, the members of which have been chosen by ITT.

Even the industries that Young hopes to attract to Palm Coast to round out its status as a complete city, must come up to ITT specifications. He says that some "just won't be able to meet our standards," and most industries will face lease-only agreements that will give ITT the power of eviction if a firm doesn't conform to anti-pollution or design requirements. "The solution to the problems of a city," Young explains, "is to have someone enlightened own it and control it."

In a state where the environment has been one of those things that traditionally got in the way of development, ITT has avoided a number of developers' past mistakes and won the praise of some conservationists. ITT has agreed to set aside an estimated 15,000 acres of its Palm Coast lands to be preserved in their natural state—a sharp contrast to the razed-earth policies that carved Miami, Fort Lauderdale and other cities out of the Florida

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

swamps. Community Development also claims to have spent more than $1 million on a variety of environmental studies, including a thirty-year master plan to supervise the city's growth to its ultimate population of 750,000.

The whole project is very close to Young's heart, and despite his usual cool, corporate firmness, anyone who even suggests that Palm Coast is not the kind of community ITT says it is, risks his wrath. "Let me tell you something," Young says, slamming a beefy fist down on the city's master plan. "A lot of people are challenging us and criticizing us, but if we and our kind of people get hit and stopped, this country is going to be in even worse shape than before. People are trying to blame the country's big developers for screwing up the cities, but this country wasn't ruined by developers. Builders built this country and the average builder puts up less than fifty houses a year. They're the ones who ruined our cities, because they didn't have the resources to do it right." He slams the desk again for emphasis.

But for all of ITT's resources, Palm Coast bears some ominous resemblances to the builder-built cities that have already ruined major portions of Florida. The city's initial 30 miles of interlocking canals, already under construction, are being built for the same reasons that the algae-choked, stagnant canals system of South Florida were cut—to make wet lands dry and provide more people with higher-priced waterfront lots.

Young insists that ITT won't be dredging any swampland, those productive ecological entities that Florida conservationists have been trying to protect for years. He says ITT's position is simple: that the Graham Swamp—a vast, cypress-festooned, alligator-infested lowland within the Palm Coast property—is not really a swamp at all. "We have no swampland. We just have areas of high elevation where there's trapped water that needs drainage." According to the company's executives, the Graham Swamp's 7-to-8-foot elevation makes it "mostly developable."

And Stanley Dea, a Levitt consultant who is directing the environmental engineering for Palm Coast from his office in New York, says that the natural state of Flagler County is not necessarily the best anyway—at least not for a city of 750,000.

"I don't think we can assume that it is intuitively virtuous not to develop any areas where there is water," he explains. "It could be a huge mosquito breeding ground and it might be highly advantageous to improve that habitat by removing certain trees and encouraging the ecological succession of other species. You can't just assume that the way the land now exists is necessarily the most favorable form; it could be very adverse from an environmental standpoint."

The company has initiated a well-publicized study to determine the effect ITT's new city may have on the area's endangered species, but the program got off to a bad start. One of the first trees bulldozed for ITT's new visitors' center held a nest that had been used for three years by a pair of Florida's dwindling number of bald eagles. The corporation's equally publicized "tree-saving program" is not quite what it appears to be. Despite ITT's promises to try to save fifty trees per acre from the magnificent palms, cypresses and live oaks that now nearly blanket the landscape, wide areas of one-time forest lands have been laid bare. Young's explanation is that the tree-saving program really means replanting seedlings after the lots are fully developed.

Palm Coast even faces the same shortage of fresh water for a growing population that now confronts areas of South Florida. The U.S. Geological Survey is openly skeptical that ITT will find enough water for 750,000 people under the entire 100,000 acres that it owns. Even the city's "planned" projections for growth got off to a dubious start. Young's own estimate of sales was short of the actual figure by nearly 50 per cent, and the early construction work is encountering a shortage of building materials and labor.

However, local residents are more inclined to judge ITT on its current activities than on its planning—or lack of it—for some distant day in the future. This year, they're especially unhappy about the site for a new high school that ITT donated to the county in the glow of wide, very favorable publicity. Later, school officials decided that the site wasn't quite what they had expected—nearly half the 40 acres was under more than a foot of standing water. They estimated that the $15,000 site would require $50,000 of preliminary work before a building could be erected on it. As a result, the county still isn't sure where it will build its much needed new school.

And down at the fishing pier in the little ocean-side community of Flagler Beach, they're still talking about the way ITT put the skids under the town's latest effort at expansion. Flagler Beach officials had planned to take three more homes into their city limits and went to the Florida legislature for approval. The proposed annexation, however, cut across some of ITT's property, and the corporation took pains to see that the proposal died in committee.

And when the Florida legislature absent-mindedly killed a major tax loophole for big developers, ITT quietly went to work to see that the dodge, known as Rose's Law, was quickly reinstated. Within a year, it was back on the books, and as a result ITT pays about one-sixth of the property taxes on individual lots that adjacent, individual owners pay.

Young is convinced that Flagler County still has a lot to learn—and gain—from ITT; he is convinced that the corporation is in a position to help. "The toughest thing is to control the areas you don't own," he says. "The only thing you can do—with your people—is to become a part of the community and try to change it through the county or the state. For instance, a lot of our zoning densities are so enlightened that we think counties will be looking at what we are doing and maybe utilizing our plans."

Young is unruffled by the fact that most of Florida's house-to-house subdivisions have roughly the same zoning densities and platted patterns that Palm Coast stipulates. "We probably have some of the smartest brains in the business," he says. "The individuals who may decide to question us are doing it only on the basis of their own experience. Our experience is infinitely larger than theirs."

However ITT uses its experience, the sleepy, rural face of Florida's Flagler County will never be the same. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & THE ARTS

The Seed that Fell into Good Ground

FREUD AND THE AMERICANS: The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876-1917. *By Nathan G. Hale, Jr. Oxford University Press. 574 pp. $15.*

MILTON CANTOR
Mr. Cantor is professor of history at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) and managing editor of Labor History.

The historian who sets out to assess Freud's contribution to American psychology confronts almost insuperable difficulties. First, the literature of psychoanalysis during its early period in the United States is almost too voluminous to absorb and synthesize. Second, much of it is either highly complex or terribly confused, for it deals with vague concepts like mind cures, dream analysis and infantile sexuality. Third, its vagueness was compounded by the fact that after 1880 psychoanalysis was in the process of being transformed from a handmaiden of philosophy into an experimental science.

Yet Professor Hale, mastering the material in question, has added quantitatively to our knowledge. Even more important, he has brought to his subject a mind singularly objective, analytical and judicious. For instance, he is interested in Freud's impact upon American psychology—and Freud is indeed *primus inter pares*, at stage center almost all the time—but Professor Hale is also aware that American psychology had an indigenous history prior to Freud's attendance at the momentous 1909 Clark University conference. He knows, too, that psychological study, as indeed all scientific work, transcends national borders and that its international aspects cannot be justifiably neglected. On the contrary, Professor Hale believes the Clark conference can only be made meaningful by recognizing the important psychological work being carried on in such places as Austria, France and England. Consequently, about one-third of this long book is devoted to the late 19th-century setting—when American psychology, dominated by empirico-materialist assumptions, believed mental disorders resulted from organic or somatic causes, such as brain lesions.

The reigning somatic theories in neurology and psychology, set in motion by such bright young neurologists as James Jackson Putnam and Silas Weir Mitchell, had their socio-cultural parallel in a moral code which also ran its course in these years. This code, of "civilized morality" (a term borrowed from Freud's landmark essay of 1908), dictated that only genital intercourse, indulged in for the purpose of procreation, was permissible. It forbade discussion of sexual topics, including birth control, venereal disease and sexual education; it decreed not only that women be kept ignorant of their sexual role but that they should not have sexual desires; and it insisted upon total sexual abstinence outside of the marriage bed. But Hale's reading of the code is overly restrictive, it would seem, since its canons did not rise *ex nihilo* at the end of the Civil War, as he suggests. Rather its roots lie deep in an earlier agrarian and Protestant morality. The belief that sexuality was animalistic and evil, distinct from human love, rather than being new as Hale intimates, was a concept familiar to Jeffersonians, schoolboys nurtured on McGuffey's readers, purchasers of Lydia Sigourney's immensely popular novels of Jacksonian America, and pro-slavery apologists who tutored their countrymen about the Negroes' bestial lusts. The stereotype of the manly man and the womanly woman, which derived in part from prudish reticence about sexual roles, was hardly unfamiliar to Americans before the Civil War. Nor did "civilized morality" end, as Hale implies, with World War I. Indeed, the postwar Bohemians relied upon a simplistic interpretation of Freudianism in order to justify their defiance of middle-class behavorial norms that were still essentially an articulation of that very morality. Before 1870, then, as well as after 1920, the claims of motherhood, premarital chastity, marital fidelity and sexual prudery were sovereign. This code may indeed have been at its apogee in Theodore Roosevelt's day, as Hale claims, and Americans may have given only lip service to it in the 1920s and 1930s. Nonetheless, its ethical imperatives are rooted in the subsoil of our history and survived well into the 20th century.

In any case, Hale finds that the morality in question came under attack before the time of Freud's psychoanalytic polemics. Its critics were Progressive period moralists who argued that the sub rosa character of sexuality thwarted any effective grappling with such urgent social questions as prostitution and venereal disease. Somaticism likewise underwent severe criticism in these pre-Freudian years, criticism advanced by figures as noteworthy as William James and the two distinguished neurologists, Adolph Meyer and Morton Prince. They were among the major figures carving out a psychoanalytic approach to mental illness that derived only partly from Freud.

Indeed, Freud's chief contribution was to reinforce and stimulate existing psychoanalytic theory and practice. His contributions were unmistakable, but Hale also emphasizes the important work of child psychologists like Arnold Gesell and James Baldwin; of the alienist Edward Cowles, who early rejected both lesion theory and hereditary taint as causative factors in psychosis; of physicians like Prince and Boris Sidis who studied the nature of dreams, though they did not interpret them symbolically as statements about the emotional life of the dreamer; of psychiatrists like Meyer, whose theory of dementia praecox was more radical than Jung's; of comparative psychologists like E. L. Thorndike; of genetic psychologists like G. Stanley Hall, who focused upon child development; of behavioralists like John B. Watson whose work would come of age only in the 1920s.

The very openness and pluralism of American society, its special strains and stresses, and the close links between popular and professional culture, fostered an accommodation with Freudianism. And they partially reshaped and redirected it. American psychiatrists agreed with the normative elements in Freud's thought, but their thinking was also governed by a unique national culture. Consequently, Freud's American disciples muted sexuality and aggression; they were more didactic, optimistic, environmentalist. While accepting the master's view of childhood sexuality, they were also at pains to note childhood innocence. They did not emphasize, as he did, the fact that the instincts were never tamed. They shifted from biological realities and the unconscious to sublimation of the libido, to the claims of society, and to the need for "adjustment." They refused to recognize that Freud diminished man's sense of his own importance, and rejected his grim supposition that human life was a cancerous anomaly. They all, especially the New England group, urged development of "social instincts" and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

primacy of social ends. And they all, especially the New York professionals, saw psychoanalysis as a tool for adjusting the individual to society. Such emphases, combined with an implicit repudiation of Freud's stoic acquiescence, made for a relatively smooth and painless transfer of Freudian thought to America. Old propositions were scarcely altered: "good" was equated with "adapted" and "rational"; "bad" with "emotional" and "immature."

Small wonder, then, that psychoanalysis was wholly appropriate to the scene. It took advantage of the erosion of traditional religion. It benefited from the great medical and popular interest in hypnosis, faith healing, and the mind-cure, self-help propositions of the Emmanuel Movement. It seemed superior to competing therapies in its practical results as well as in its sense of understanding the patient. It suggested hope, efficiency and social utility. It was optimistic about the range of ailments psychoanalysis could treat—more so than Freud himself. Intelligent lay readers who subscribed to *McClure's* and who sought new moral guidelines were attracted. Psychoanalysis seemed to suggest a new scientific panacea that included daring though happily vague theories of sexuality. Cultural radicals of the decade, like Floyd Dell and Max Eastman, turned instinctively to Freud as they sought new styles of living, celebrated the intuitive, experiential and irrational, proclaimed sexual equality and the emancipated woman, and fashioned a cult of primitivism that made holy war upon middle-class values. Hale does not explore their motives, or the extent of their conversion, promising to do so later—for *Freud and the Americans* is only one of two projected volumes on the subject. Possibly he will explain why they were attracted by the teachings of an austere, rationalistic, conservative, puritanical Viennese physician who saw art as hedonistic and self-indulgent. Perhaps, too, he will comment upon Freud's disastrous influence on American letters and upon the Freudian devolution to the school of Norman O. Brown and the American acolytes of R. D. Laing.

The projected second volume ought in any case to be more carefully organized and more sternly edited. *Freud and the Americans* is at times maddeningly repetitious. It lacks a sense of structure that would enable the reader to see how the work of August Weismann and James M. Baldwin evolved—through post-Darwinian, rigid animal analogy, instinct theory, genetic psychology, Watson's behaviorism and a radical environmentalism—to a sophisticated interpretation of behavior, a physiological-environmental interaction that included heredity, animal drives, cognitive processes and social behavior and structure. But one should not cavil. *Freud and the Americans* exhibits great learning, exacting interpretation and provocative criticism. □

Literary Fun and Games

GRIPS. *By M. D. Elevitch. Grossman Publishers. 111 pp. $6.95.*

RONALD DE FEO
Mr. De Feo's short stories have appeared in the Transatlantic, Massachusetts, North American *and* Roanoke Reviews.

This first novel by the founder of the little magazine *First Person* is just a slip of a thing, a mere 111 pages, none of which is exactly overcrowded with words. It might be a bit cruel to say that the book is too long at that, but trying to stay with this insufferably cute, precious, experimental novel is a chore frustrating and painful enough to leave any reader in a foul mood. *Grips* would not even be worth mentioning were it not for the fact that in its tone and method it is another work in a long line of contemporary American fictions given to fun and games. For me, it was the straw that broke the camel's back, and it caused me to reflect on why so many novels of this kind irritate me, why they are being written at all and are appearing with such regularity.

One can understand the need for writers to experiment with form and technique, breaking away from the structures and demands of conventional fiction. Writers, especially those who have consumed a great deal of fiction, grow weary of the traditional, and in their own work try to avoid the mechanical, the predictable, the contrived. They do not wish to produce a well-rounded character, for that would require them to explore the character's past and invent experiences that have made him what he is today. At this point in time, haven't these methods become tedious? Can writers bring themselves to write in such an obviously old-fashioned manner? Plotting is as unattractive as developing a character in depth, for it too is old-fashioned and theatrical. The writer must now let his imagination run wild and discover fresh techniques and concerns which will make his work seem new and different, and which will make the act of writing itself a freer, more open task. All well and good. But in the process the writer should keep his reader in mind. If he is going to dispense with or underplay the traditional concerns, then he must find something to take their place. After all, if he is writing to be read, then there must be something in his work that will grip and hold his reader—images, the use of language, ideas. Of these, coherent and interesting ideas are perhaps most crucial to a work of fiction, for without them the work falls apart, has no direction, no purpose. (And by ideas I do not mean messages or morals, but thoughts that animate the work and have a life of their own within it.)

Unfortunately, in much highly regarded experimental fiction at present, the most significant and startling idea is that the mechanics of traditional fiction are absurd. Thus the writer spends a good deal of his time satirizing the traditional novel or story, or fooling around with the old forms in the hope of delighting and charming the sophisticated reader. His works then are not really novels or stories but extended literary "in" jokes. Remarkably, many readers and critics are taken by these joke and game books—witness the reception accorded John Barth's *Lost in the Funhouse,* Donald Barthelme's *Snow White* and Robert Coover's *Pricksongs and Other Descants* (among Coover's mentors, in fact, are Barth and Barthelme). The literary prankster can imply, of course, that the absurdities and irrelevancies of fiction are metaphors for the absurdities and irrelevancies of life; some readers who discover the intended connection for themselves may be bowled over by its profundity, but the more demanding will be unimpressed. The writer becomes a performer, a literary comedian who wishes to dazzle the reader with his stylistic tricks, his clever asides. Since he finds fiction absurd, he feels that he must constantly remind the reader not to take what he is reading too seriously. To play the game becomes an end in itself.

The problem with fiction of this kind is that even if the writer has some serious purpose in mind, that purpose is often buried under all the jokes. The reader would feel ridiculous trying seriously to interpret or penetrate a work that doesn't take itself seriously. It was silly for critics to hunt for all sorts of philosophical meanings in Nabokov's last novel, *Ada.* Though I admire Nabokov, I found the game-playing in that novel, the winking at the reader, simply too self-indulgent, too unrelieved; it made the whole book a literary put-on. Unfortunately, many young American writers apparently feel that they must play games

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of some sort to be "in." Since so many are playing, why not join the crowd? Thus a usually no-nonsense writer like Gilbert Sorrentino (*Steelwork*) produces *Imaginative Qualities of Actual Things*, a novel made up of innumerable asides and reminders. (If writers are not playing specific literary games then they are playing games with labyrinths. Influenced by such labyrinthine writers as Kafka, Beckett and Borges, they construct labyrinths of situation and language. Thus we have Rudolph Wurlitzer's incredibly tedious *Nog* and *Flats*, both essentially language and game books, and Joseph McElroy's fascinating, but ultimately impenetrable novels, *A Smuggler's Bible*, *Hind's Kidnap* and *Ancient History*, all elaborately plotted and elliptically executed.)

M. D. Elevitch belongs very much to the Barthelme school of literary fun and games. If Elevitch hasn't been directly influenced by Barthelme—and I'd be surprised to learn that he hasn't—he definitely shares his sensibility. The writer in this case has such contempt for traditional fiction that he refuses to include *anything* in his work that might be taken seriously, or be considered un-hip or vaguely conventional. He must show at every step that he is aware of the absurdity of attempting to create character, describe an action or a place, pursue an idea or a story line. Therefore everyone and everything in his novel must be ridiculous. In *Grips* the protagonist, John-Juan (funny?) Bascom, is a rich "marine micrometrist" (funny?) pursued by his estranged wife, Crinoline (funny?), and her lawyer and occasional lover, who hope to get some money from Bascom. They are particularly interested in knowing if the man has completed his will, and they frequently send him letters pursuing the matter. John-Juan travels to various exotic points on the globe, meets and marries Cessie, his first wife's 13-year-old daughter, who may very well be his own child (though he assumes she has been fathered by André, a trampoline artist and another of Crinoline's lovers). Various other morons figure in the nonaction, notably J.-J.'s mother, who seems to have "a thing" for her son. The first chapter (labeled zero) is actually the last chapter, and we are told in chapter zero that John-Juan drowns on a beach in Ibiza where he had stupidly pitched a tent too close to the water's edge. The rest of the chapters, then, are flashbacks to trivial events in John-Juan's trivial life. Since we assume, correctly, after the first few uneventful chapters, that nothing much is going to happen in the rest of the novel, and since we know that John-Juan will eventually end up in Ibiza where he

NEW DIRECTIONS

ANTHOLOGY

New Directions 24. "The first story in this exciting collection has more wit, social observation, insight, and art in it than most such anthologies all put together . . . Other stories, essays, and poetry are on the same high level."—*Publishers' Weekly*. Cloth, $8.95; Paper, $3.45

NICANOR PARRA

Emergency Poems. New antipoetry. Ed., and trans. by Miller Williams. Bilingual. $8.75; $2.75

KENNETH PATCHEN

In Quest of Candlelighters. Illustrated collection of prose and poetry. $6.95; $1.95

JOHN CROWE RANSOM

Beating the Bushes: Selected Essays 1941-70. Eleven critical pieces—one unpublished. $7.95; $3.45

DYLAN THOMAS

Early Prose Writings. Includes samples and excerpts: short story & novel, radio & film script, essay & review—most unpublished in U.S. $8.75

TENNESSEE WILLIAMS

The Theatre of Tennessee Williams. Volume IV in an ongoing series: *Sweet Bird of Youth*, *Period of Adjustment*, *Night of the Iguana*. $10.00

OTHER PAPERBOOKS

John Hawkes: *The Blood Oranges*, $1.95; Thomas Merton: *New Seeds of Contemplation*, $2.25; Martin Turnell: *Baudelaire: A Study of His Poetry*, $3.45; Jonathan Williams: *An Ear in Bartram's Tree*, $1.95.

Please request complete catalog

NEW DIRECTIONS 333 Sixth Ave. N.Y. N.Y. 10014

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

will die, there is really little reason for reading on. The writer certainly doesn't want to be accused of creating character, so he puts before us a group of nincompoops who could have walked off the pages of a comic book. They are as thin as cartoons, and often use a self-conscious jargon. When Mom Bascom invites her son to join her in a sauna bath she says: "Be at ease. I have nothing on either, under this white, stain-proof smock." Her son asks: "Those efficient-looking pens and pencils—why are they clipped in your marcelled, platinum hair?" Barthelme, for some reason, is absolutely mad about this sort of exchange and uses it in story after story. It was perhaps mildly amusing in the beginning, but by now he has so overworked the routine that it has become predictable, cute and tedious. Elevitch has not helped his book by borrowing the technique and employing it ad nauseam. And, unfortunately, one can pick out other Barthelmeisms—the technique, for example, of detailing a character's thought and then having him express the same thought: "Being Anglo-American he did not know whether to be diffident or hearty. 'Tell me mother,' he said 'being Anglo-American, should I be diffident or hearty?' "

Elevitch can't really be bothered with describing his characters' surroundings (for detailed description, attempting to create a world is also terribly old-fashioned, and is, admittedly, a chore) so when John-Juan is in, let's say, Newark, Elevitch simply tells us that John-Juan is in Newark. At times Elevitch does produce a few more details, in the shape of John-Juan's travel notes: For Mogadiscio he records: "Plane touched down, Italian signs, Italian camaraderie, men in large costumes all lounging together at the barrier, you'd think they'd want to be apart in the heat."

Since *Grips* is so thin in character and description, and quite unstartling in its use of language, the reader hopes at least for a few laughs along the way—after all, the book is described on the dust jacket as a comic novel. But he discovers that he would have to be as moronic as Elevitch's characters to find humor in the lines and situations. A single example is quite representative. Says J.-J. to his mother when they are in the sauna bath: "The bottom is divine." Mom exclaims: "John-Juan, that's obscene. Forget about bottoms."

One wonders what, if anything, Elevitch was trying to say or do in this novel. If his only purpose was to poke fun at conventional fiction and concerns, then he accomplished that in the first few chapters and had no need to go on joking to the last of his 111 pages. If he wished to show how pointless life is by having his characters involved in pointless situations, he again made his point quite early, and even at that stage was unable to interest the reader in the pointless events. (Alvin Greenberg, a cleverer and more imaginative writer than Elevitch, ran into similar difficulties when he tried to charm the reader with pointlessness in his recent novel, *Going Nowhere*, in which the protagonist goes nowhere.) As far as his characters are concerned, Elevitch certainly cannot claim that they are satirical portraits of human beings or types, for they strike the reader as incredibly eccentric and could only function in a comic-book world. If Elevitch is satirizing people, who and where are those people? The author has attempted to explain his book, describing it as "a novel of reality-tokens, controls, *grips*, such as time, place, family, marriage, language itself." But I don't understand what that mumbo jumbo has to do with the novel at hand.

What makes *Grips* (as well as other novels and stories like it) so unattractive and finally repulsive is its lack of personality and emotion, its coldness. Though the novel is supposed to entertain the reader, it leaves him feeling empty and dead, not only because of its low regard for fiction but also because of its low regard for life. Emotions are absurd, so why bother to deal with them at all? People are trivial and stupid, and in a work of fiction they must appear as fools who possess no feeling, suffer no pain, experience no love, have no fear. Since life is meaningless one has only that meaninglessness to consider and convey. Is it any wonder that, with such an attitude, Elevitch and writers like him devote themselves to fun and games?

In recent years I have read unusual, intelligent and memorable novels and short story collections by European and South American writers—books, for example, by Bichsel, Puig, Landolfi, Bernhard, Márquez and Andersch. All were, in their own way, as unconventional as recent American experimental works. But the foreign books held my interest much more than our home-grown products. Why? Because the authors were not afraid of emotions and ideas. Even Peter Bichsel's very short, puzzling sketches suggest that the author cared about his shadowy characters. And behind his charming, witty sketches were ideas—vague and difficult, perhaps, but there nevertheless. A reader values such intelligence and concern. There's nothing wrong with having fun with literature. But endless literary games must be boring, especially when played by automatons. □

HOOK

Nights we spend apart
I am at the bottom of a lake
with my loneliness.
Even a fishhook
would taste good.
I throw myself a line.
I write.

Night terrors come back.
I am four.
There is a man under the bed
who holds his breath
so I will think he's dead.
I know he's cheating
& I hold mine too.
We wait each other out.

Last gasp.
The water fills my lungs.
WOMAN KILLED BY DROWNING
IN HER DREAMS.

At the bottom of the world
where books dissolve,
where pencils turn to salt,
where Venice sinks
under the weight
of stolen gold,
the blind fish bump me
& I turn to them. . .

I speak their silent thoughts
before I sleep.

Erica Jong

The Best Way To Get THE NATION

THE NATION 5-1-72

333 Sixth Ave., New York 10014

☐ One Year, $12.50

☐ Two Years, $23.00

☐ 6 Months, $7.50

Payment Enclosed

(Add $1 per year postage for Canada and Mexico; $2 other foreign)

Name .....

Address .....

City .....

State .....Zip No.....

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Humanist ...is on the cutting edge of the new morality.

THE HUMANIST is the leading magazine in America today dealing with the rapid changes in value. It deals with the frontiers of science, society, and ethics. It consistently presents leaders of thought and action reflecting upon moral problems as they arise in contemporary society.

Have you seen the current issue?

HERBERT MARCUSE ON
"THE LEFT UNDER THE COUNTERREVOLUTION"
Is there a counterrevolution going on in the United States? Herbert Marcuse maintains that there is, and outlines an entirely new strategy for the left.

FRITZ MACHLUP ON
"UNIVERSAL HIGHER EDUCATION: PROMISE OR ILLUSION?"
Is the ideal of universal higher education an illusion? Professor Machlup, former president of the American Association of University Professors, thinks so, and tells why.

THE PROBLEM OF PRISONS — A WAY OUT?
A special symposium, featuring Frank Rundle, David F. Greenberg, Ramsey Clark, and others.

ALSO: ANTONY FLEW ON "A PROTESTANT ATHEIST," PAUL KURTZ AND BETTE CHAMBERS ON "TV AND THE GOD-HUCKSTERS," ROY FAIRFIELD ON "THE DIGNITY OF HANDS."

In forthcoming issues:

MORAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN
What will replace religious teaching in the schools? Secular humanists examine new forms of moral education. With Lawrence Kohlberg, Lester Kirkendall, and others.

ETHICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES
What are the moral implications of new breakthroughs in the biosphere? With Daniel Callahan, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, and others.

ALSO: NICHOLAS JOHNSON ON "THE CAREENING OF AMERICA," and B. F. SKINNER ON "A REPLY TO MY CRITICS — BEHAVIORISM AND HUMANISM."

Editorial Board (partial list)

Miriam Allen deFord
Rudolf Driekurs
Albert Ellis
Edward L. Ericson
Herbert Feigl
Jerome Frank
Charles Frankel
R. Buckminster Fuller
Hector Hawton
Julian Huxley
Lester A. Kirkendall
Corliss Lamont
B. F. Skinner
Harold Taylor
Maurice B. Visscher

Editor, Paul Kurtz

Associate Editors:
Roy Fairfield — David Cole Gordon — Khoren Arisian

Contributing Editors:
Lionel Abel — David T. Bazelon
Leslie A. Fiedler — Robert Tyler

Film, Harry M. Geduld
Drama, Julius Novick
Poetry, M. L. Rosenthal
Chess, Larry Evans

THE HUMANIST
is provocative, lively, and controversial.

Note: Receive the current issue *free* when you enclose your payment.

Subscribe today...

THE HUMANIST, P.O. Box 5, Amherst, N.Y. 14226

Yes, I want to receive THE HUMANIST beginning with the current issue. Please enter my subscription:

___One year $6.00 ___Two years $10.00 ___Three years $13.50

Name _____ ☐ Please bill me.

Address _____ ☐ I enclose my payment, please send current issue free.

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Skipper After God

THE ARNHEITER AFFAIR. *By Neil Sheehan. Random House. 304 pp. $7.95.*

PHILIP BLAKE
Mr. Blake is a reporter for The Chicago Daily News. *He was a line officer in the Navy, on destroyer service, for a three-year period ending in 1969.*

The ninety-nine days that Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter commanded the *U.S.S. Vance* make a tale of the sea as complex and terrifying as the one recounted in *The Caine Mutiny. The Arnheiter Affair,* however, is nonfiction. And Neil Sheehan's superb reconstruction of Arnheiter's bizarre term as captain of the *Vance* is more than a good story: it is an illuminating comment on the state of the military and some of its chronic problems.

As Arnheiter took command of the *Vance*, an aging destroyer escort, in 1965, he dreamed of himself as a naval hero above common men, a modern-day Lord Nelson or John Paul Jones. He had had an erratic career before he boarded the ship at Pearl Harbor. Almost immediately he began to exhibit quirks that bewildered and harried the men under him. He ordered the entire crew to attend Protestant church services he conducted at sea, a clear violation of their rights and of Navy regulations. He summoned his top officers to meetings of a "war council" to plot strategy for their role in the Vietnamese War. He insisted that they wear sidearms—despite the fact that they were at sea with no one nearby.

As the *Vance* steamed off Vietnam, Arnheiter played more and more the role of martinet, insisting on boot-camp standards in demeanor and uniform despite the fact that they were in a war zone in 90-degree heat. At the same time, he disregarded elementary standing orders, and the rules of safety for a ship at sea.

As Sheehan points out, the captain of a Navy ship is in a position of sanctity. He has complete authority, and accordingly his judgment and knowledge of the sea are critically important to those under him. The crew of the *Vance* reacted predictably to Arnheiter's vagaries: their morale sank, their performance suffered and their emotions were raw.

Arnheiter's behavior was finally brought to the attention of his superiors, who relieved him summarily. But, in doing so, because the *Vance* was operating in a war zone, they ignored Navy tradition that a full inquiry precede such a drastic step.

That was the Arnheiter story. What followed was really the Arnheiter affair—a controversy the captain touched off when he vociferously disputed the Navy's action in relieving him. Arnheiter petitioned Congressmen, retired admirals and the press, insisting that he had been done in by a conspiracy of slovenly junior officers, and senior officers who were too timid to back up his campaign to "vigorously prosecute the war."

The affair raged in Congress and the press for months; of course it was a *cause célèbre* in the Navy. The press and elements of the government fell victim to Arnheiter's public relations campaign and his sensational countercharges. Newspapers printed his accusations without checking with anyone else involved in the affair. Sheehan, who covered the story for *The New York Times,* reserves his harshest criticism for the press (including his role in it), which he says was taken in by Arnheiter's PR techniques and gave countenance and currency to his spurious charges. Sheehan writes:

> The techniques of the government propagandist and the public relations man, which Arnheiter utilized so cleverly, long ago outraced a tired community of hemmed-in reporters, editors who ask the wrong questions and publishers who are more interested in profits than in the quality and accuracy of the information they print. . . . The time-honored newspaper technique of scribbling a few details in a notebook, hustling them into something readable on a typewriter, casting the words into a column, and then rushing on to another story the next day, was appropriate to police-beat reporting in Chicago in the 1920s. It is an anachronism today. Those of us in the trade know that the consequence of the cycle is the daily publication of falsehood and bias in favor of those who best know how to exploit its weakness.

Arnheiter was an unusual phenomenon in military life. But many of his traits—his highly idiosyncratic view of people and events, his craving for fame in battle, and his obsequiousness to superiors—are observable to some degree in other career officers. These traits develop in a closed institution like the military, where there is little that intrudes from the outside in terms of basic outlook. In the past, the most common and pervasive outside influence has come from officers and enlisted men who were drafted or who signed up for two or three years. They were indoctrinated as military men, but many maintained a civilian view about what they were doing —what was important and what was trivial or distorted. On the *Vance,* a number of the officers and men were able to dilute the consequences of Arnheiter's strange behavior. And finally, when it became necessary, one officer reported what was happening to higher authority (albeit in a surreptitious, somewhat less than admirable manner).

In this sense, the Arnheiter case points up the danger of the proposal for an all-volunteer army. If we abandon our traditional concept of a citizen army, the military may become an institution even more closed off from the rest of the world. □

Architect of Nuremberg

BRAHMIN IN REVOLT: A Biography of Herbert C. Pell. *By Leonard Baker. Doubleday & Co. 350 pp. $7.95.*

EUGENE G. WINDCHY
Mr. Windchy, the author of Tonkin Gulf, *is a specialist in foreign affairs. He spent twelve years in East Asia with the U.S. Army and U.S. Information Agency.*

Herbert C. Pell, heir to the Lorillard tobacco fortune, was a man of fashion who took to dabbling in public affairs. His life achieved significance because, through the alchemy of World War II, Pell for a time became the embattled keeper of the world's conscience. The former *bon vivant* discharged his duties well, as if he had been saved for the occasion. The values of some harder-working, more ambitious men were found wanting.

This ably written, entertaining biography opens with Pell's childhood, depicting its subject as one of the happiest, most privileged offspring of the Gilded Age. Born in 1884, Herbie Pell grew up in Tuxedo Park, whence the "tuxedo" dinner jacket took its name. The Pell family had been prominent in North America ever since it arrived in the 17th century, and in England before then. A John Pell served Oliver Cromwell as a diplomat. His son, also named John, was knighted by King Charles II. Inheriting lands in the New World, Sir John disembarked here in 1672. He was appointed commissioner for Indian Affairs of the colony of New York, and he demonstrated the family's talent for diplomacy by having his son marry an Indian princess. Today one of their descendants, Claiborne de Borda Pell, sits on the For-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FINAL EXAM

1. *Why did the last bird leave?*
2. *If you had forty nights in the desert,*
   a basket of fish all staring into space,
   and a host of solid knuckle bones,
   who would you feed first?
   who would you feed last?
3. *Who are the "higher minds" in line 90?*
   If you do not remember line 90
   make up your own—time is money.
4. *List your ( ) in the order of their ( ).*
5. *Is your ( ) locked?*
6. *Who do you love?*
   Whom *do you love?*
   How much difference does it make, if any?
7. *Discuss the simplicity of question 6.*
8. *Is the descriptive section organized?*
9. *Looking back, what did the last bird look like?*
10. *Be brief.*

Gary Gildner

A NEW HARPER PAPERBACK

"An original and much-needed insight into the thrust and assumptions of the so-called Kissinger-Nixon doctrine . . . as good an analysis as I have seen of the basic values and purposes which guide the present Administration's conduct of American foreign policy." – SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT. P/253 $1.50

Harper & Row
49 E. 33rd St., New York 10016

eign Relations Committee of the United States Senate. Senator Pell is the son of the subject of this book, Herbert Claiborne Pell.

Herbert Pell attended Harvard College at the same time as Franklin D. Roosevelt, another New Yorker of patrician stock. The two shared a sense of *noblesse oblige* that eventually led them both into public service. But Pell, except in matters of form, was impulsive and lacked discipline. Instead of earning a college degree in three years, as did the young FDR, Pell dropped out in two. He despised Harvard as materialistic, and decided that a better education could be obtained by reading books and traveling in Europe. For the next ten years, Pell did just that.

It is tempting to compare Herbert Pell at this stage to a modern hippie. But he did not let his quest for knowledge mar a fashionable appearance or interfere with his membership in high society. True, Pell showed a spirit of adventure by roaming Europe in a horseless carriage, but he did so with a chauffeur and plenty of baggage. The elegant youth almost joined the U.S. diplomatic service. He declined the honor upon learning that it would entail a summer's schooling in Washington, D.C. Yet he was not the languid type of aristocrat. He was a man of great energy and huge physical size. Pell could manhandle a donkey or right an overturned car—both talents useful to the continental motorist in the early 1900s.

The self-educated young man returned home in 1912. Taking up politics, Pell was back in time to campaign for Teddy Roosevelt and the Progressive Party, thus scandalizing the whole of Tuxedo Park. That didn't bother Pell. The obverse of his social conscience was a hatred of businessmen. Upon hearing that a relative was going into business, he once blurted, "Oh, I'm so sorry." Pell dabbled in politics from time to time, serving a term in Congress as a Democrat. But the significant part of his working career did not begin until 1937 when his old friend, Franklin D. Roosevelt, sent him to Europe as a diplomat. It was a time when acute, knowledgeable observers were needed, and—educators take note—Pell qualified. He had been an early critic of Mussolini and Hitler. He predicted a new war when more distinguished statesmen thought they were building a generation of peace.

Herbert Pell will be remembered, however, for what he did during the latter part of World War II as the American delegate—and ex-delegate—to the fourteen-nation War Crimes Commission. President Roosevelt proposed such a commission in 1942. The idea was a popular one, but it met resistance among bureaucrats on both sides of the Atlantic. Officials did not welcome the problem of defining war crimes, the task of collecting evidence, the responsibility of establishing precedents. Heads of state traditionally were immune from prosecution; the British thought about sending Adolf Hitler into exile, as they had done with Napoleon. There was a feeling, not uncommon today, that "war crimes" were unnecessary acts of violence committed by persons of low rank. War itself was not thought to be a crime. It was an extension of national policy—regrettable, of course, but inevitable. The feeling of ordinary people was better expressed by the writer George Orwell: ". . . A world in which it is wrong to murder an individual civilian and right to drop a thousand tons of high explosive on a residential area does sometimes make me wonder whether this earth of ours is not a looney-bin made use of by some other planet."

Herbert Pell shared that point of view. Furthermore, he could see that if high-ranking individuals were immune from prosecution, and if low-ranking individuals claimed that they simply were following orders, then in the end nobody would be responsible for anything. That was no way, said Pell, to go about preventing a third World War.

The War Crimes Commission was slow to get organized and slow to take action. It did not begin meeting until the fall of 1943, and the American delegate was not present. Pell had been appointed months before, but the commission was to meet in London, and the State Department delayed his departure—for no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

constructive purpose. When Pell did get to London, he lacked instructions. Meanwhile, as the authorities dawdled, millions of innocent civilians, Jewish and non-Jewish, were being exterminated in occupied Europe, and no clear policy of retribution was being promulgated. *Not until the fall of 1944 was Hitler identified as a possible war criminal,* for Winston Churchill did not agree to the policy until he was impelled to do so by criticism in the press and in Parliament.

Despite the absence of any encouragement from the State Department, Herbert Pell fought for the apprehension and punishment of war criminals. Pell thought of war as a crime. He regarded Hitler as an arch criminal; he wanted the German leaders tried by an international court; he even subscribed to the notion that the massacre of German and Hungarian Jews ("enemy aliens") was an evil act for which somebody should be held to account. Such zeal was too much for the State Department, which maneuvered to have Pell ousted from the War Crimes Commission just as he was about to be elected chairman.

Just who were the persons behind the ouster of Herbert Pell? His biographer, Leonard Baker, puts the blame on career men within the State Department. I would note, however, that the Secretary of State was involved, and that he, as befits an American Secretary of State, was no mere diplomat. Edward R. Stettinius had come to Washington from the United States Steel Corporation.

In any event, the former war crimes commissioner turned the situation to the advantage of his cause. Instead of retiring gracefully, as a gentleman is expected to do, Pell charged like a bull stuck full of banderillas. Eventually, the War Crimes Commission was permitted to adopt the program he had recommended. If the shades of Nuremberg haunt Washington today, it is because of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and one of his more inspired appointments—a beefy Brahmin that refused to go to pasture. □

Simple, But Not That Simple

NIGHT OF THE AXE. *By William Mulvihill. Houghton Mifflin Co. 185 pp. $5.95.*

DAN LEVIN
Mr. Levin's latest book is a study of the young Spinoza (Weybright & Talley).

Mulvihill is a novelist worth reading. He is original, tells a story well, and has a big theme. He once said to me (arrogantly), "I'm different from you and most writers because my writing is based on biology, not on literature." I didn't relish that, but there's an ounce of truth in it. His concern—his whole concern—is with the question of what human nature is. To some extent, that's a question of biology.

Night of the Axe is his best-written book. It is economical, even sparse, and the action is swift. In it he makes clear, as he couldn't before, where he really stands on his one big theme.

It has not been hard to misunderstand Mulvihill's permeating outlook. He is fascinated and absorbed by certain big general problems of human nature—the need to dominate, the attraction of violence, the desire to destroy others and oneself. He gives these potent negative drives full value. Each of his novels centers on them. Some reviewers of his earlier books thought that, like Jack London, he glorified the *Ubermensch* and thus leaned toward Nazism. They misunderstood; but I'm not sure he himself knew, until this book, how affirmative, in an old American sense, his own values are.

I first read Mulvihill after having come across a remaindered copy of his World War II novel, *Fire Mission.* My own first novel had been about World War II, and the comparison was instructive. My book was romantic; and my Marines were the American boys I knew, and who still exist, in essence unchanged. (Quite unlike Mailer's infantrymen, who were tough-guy projections.) Mulvihill's artillerymen were very like my Marines, perhaps a few years older. But he did one thing no other war novelist did (without crying "Shame!"). He insisted that the men loved war, for its own sake, loved the violence and the sense of freedom and power—even when frightened and even though they knew better.

He was working from honest observation, from biology as he saw it. His findings were the same as William James's, who after World War I called for "a moral equivalent to war"; and the same idea has been stated recently by Konrad Lorenz. The desire for violence and destruction, however organized, under whatever slogans, is only too real—war protests and peace movements notwithstanding. Mulvihill made his point so coolly that some readers thought he approved of the state of affairs that he described.

Another of his novels, *Sands of Kalahari,* won some notice, and became a popular movie. Set in Africa, it is a statement about civilized people's savage possibilities. If man chooses the savage life, it says, he is a stronger and more capable animal than any giant baboon. Again, it was not clear whether Mulvihill was admiring his creation or sounding a warning.

Night of the Axe presents the same big negatives of the Mulvihill repertory. "There was the urge to destroy," one character says. "An impulse to smash and obliterate that was hidden just under the surface." But in this book the "positive" counter-instincts—rationality, responsibility, purpose, desire to construct—are more clear and more urgent.

The time is that of the Mexican War. A party from Missouri is trying to cross the mountains to California. They come upon a huge, lordly tree. The group's chosen leader (simple, rational, responsible, purposeful) knows they need to push on, before the snow falls. His antagonists are wild men, driven by impulse, who attract and dominate the waverers as the amoral strong often do. There is a struggle for allegiance. The irrational destruction of the magnificent tree becomes the goal of the aimlessly violent. "They prove themselves," one of the women tells her daughter. "On the tree. It's great and tall and old. They want to see it fall." A carnage of human destruction follows. The man who cares, and has a goal—California—persists. The rest of the book confirms the theme and the message.

Mulvihill may have separated the dark from the light too readily. In this book he wanted very much, I think, to be the humanist as well as the student of biology. And his book performs a special service by offering a contrast with the celebration of self-destruction that is so common in current fiction.

One weakness in this book, and in his others, is not a weakness in Mulvihill's own terms. His characters, while not stock figures, are types. He does not spill his guts out creating them; they don't have much interior life. But they are all the better suited to illustrate in big strokes and in dramatic action the theme of his morality play.

Writers and books he may remind you of? Possibly Walter Van Tilburg Clark. Golding's *Lord of the Flies*? A bit. B. Traven? Not the Traven of *The Death Ship* but the Traven of *The Treasure of the Sierra Madre*; this novel ranks with it as a tale, and its theme runs deeper. Jack London? Mulvihill, once scratched, is no celebrant of the *Ubermensch* at all, no partisan of the will to dominate or the savage life. He asserts, clearly now, that there is much more to human nature than the power of the irrational. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Boredom and Other Good Reasons

ROOTS OF WAR: The Men and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy. *By Richard J. Barnet. Atheneum Publishers. 341 pp. $10.*

RICHARD J. WALTON
Mr. Walton's Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Foreign Policy of John F. Kennedy *was recently published by Viking.*

One has come to expect fine and important books of Richard Barnet. This time he has surpassed himself. Barnet attempts nothing less than to determine why this nation, with its conviction that it means only to do good, has brought such misery to the world in the past quarter-century. What we've done and how we've done it are clear, but the why remains elusive.

Perhaps we're still too close to the cold war for a definitive view, but Barnet is persuasive. He seeks no simplistic answer but pursues an inquiry in three main areas: those who govern, the governed, and the nature of American capitalism. I think most readers will be especially interested in his unrelenting critique of the "national security managers." His analysis of American capitalism, in which he convincingly questions the Marxist doctrine that capitalism is to blame for everything, is provocative and understandable even to the reader who begins to shudder at the mention of the word "economics." But without underestimating the economic basis of American foreign policy, Barnet seems to hold a view that I've long shared, that the roots of the cold war are to be found even more in the realm of psychology than of economics.

Barnet discusses the role of labor unions, organized religion, the press and the academic community, none of which can escape significant responsibility for the cold war and the resultant dispossession, destruction and death. This will be uncomfortable reading for those—which means most people in positions of authority—who not only accepted the cold-war myths but helped spread them until they were destroyed by the Vietnamese War. Most of us, moreover, in whatever walk of life, accepted those myths unquestioningly, since they were consonant with the conviction that "We're number one."

Barnet examines the nature of this American chauvinism, and he demonstrates that anti-communism was a glue that held together disparate elements of our society. He discusses, along the way, the role that simple boredom plays in the spawning of war. (I would give this hypothesis more prominence than he does.) Norman Mailer may have been on to something when he suggested some years back that violence could be reduced in our society if we allowed young people to compete in various kinds of contests, dangerous but controlled, that would alleviate the hideous boredom of industrial society. Maybe, on a more genteel level, something of the kind could be devised for an older generation as well.

All this is good stuff, but it's when Barnet gets to the elite, the national security managers, the descendants of Teddy Roosevelt and Henry Stimson, who have run things during the last quarter-century, that he is most compelling. The McCloys, the Achesons, the McNamaras, the Bundys, the Rostows—those awesomely bright, fearfully well-informed, prodigiously energetic men are stripped bare; we are led to reflect that the nation and the world would have been far better off if they had been spared the brilliance and the energy of these men. Barnet explains, convincingly to me, how these super-achievers, moral in their personal lives, could do such appalling things to faceless and nameless but flesh-and-blood human beings in the poor nations of the world. He discusses their capacity for the abstraction and quantification that turn human beings into numbers. He discusses their chauvinism, their puritanical self-righteousness, their passion for controlling human aspiration,

BAMBOO

monday but the sun
hasn't arrived you wait
the girl peers beyond you
for a rippling of water
some sign
that more than the feet collected on bus stops
more than the refraction of light on steel
sheds in the mountains
something closer to the sound of throats
closing on water
to that single cloud serene as a duck
closer to the hooves of horses sinking in mud
and pulled out again mouths
from the breast

you move or
it is a dream
the trees are teaching you the voice of the wind
and this time
you're listening

Barbara Hughes

Free to Authors

OF BOOK MANUSCRIPTS

Is your manuscript ready (or almost ready) for publication? Send for this valuable booklet packed with information every writer should have. Tells how to get your work published, promoted, distributed. Write Vantage Press, Dept. FR-59, 516 West 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001

DO YOU SAVE
BACK ISSUES OF THE NATION?

If so, you might want our Semi-Annual Index to guide you to a particular editorial, article or review, all arranged by subject, title and author. The following are available:

Vol. 212 (Jan. thru June 1971)
211 (July thru Dec. 1970)
210 (Jan. thru June 1970)
209 (July thru Dec. 1969)
208 (Jan. thru June 1969)

Each Index is $1.00 (2 for $1.50).
Please include payment with order.

THE NATION
333 Sixth Ave., New York 10014
Please send Indexes to following Volumes: $1.00 per Index (2 for $1.50)

_____
_____

Payment Enclosed $_____

Name .....

Address .....

City .....

State .....Zip .....

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and does so in cool and measured terms —more effective than the anger one imagines he has successfully struggled to discipline. Barnet's exposition makes us recall Nuremberg and the fate of those tried there, and then think of Robert McNamara at the World Bank, McGeorge Bundy at the Ford Foundation and William Bundy as editor of *Foreign Affairs*. This, while the whole inverted pyramid of national guilt is being borne by the pathetic Lieutenant Calley. Barnet's judgment upon them may be as close as the responsible politicians will come to being brought to justice; yet, as they are men who have sought the esteem of their countrymen, perhaps that judgment imposes no insignificant sanction. That is particularly so because Barnet's intention is not to condemn but to explain, and there is no way to explain without throwing a harsh light upon the conduct of these men of power.

Since Barnet's explanation also includes an analysis of the economic motives for imperialism, it would be unfair not to mention it, if only briefly. He questions the oft-cited contention that capitalism is responsible for the modern versions of imperialism by pointing out that the national security structure of Russia is remarkably like ours. It is doubtful that the people of East Berlin, Hungary and Czechoslovakia found any superior merit in Socialist tanks. The obvious response is that a democratic socialism would be different from totalitarian socialism, but Barnet argues that even a Socialist America would have an almost irresistible impulse toward empire. It is true that a Socialist America could by redistributing wealth greatly expand its internal market and thus lessen the classic dependence of capitalism on overseas markets. Yet unless America were to change its society more than now seems likely, even under socialism it would still consume far more than its proportionate share of the world's resources. This would almost certainly mean empire, economic if not military.

Looking over these words, I find that I have just begun to discuss this book's many excellences—an indication of the scope of Barnet's achievement. □

RESORT

TROLLHAUGEN FARM, NEWFANE, VERMONT 05345. 802-365-7635. Charming country inn. Delightful rooms, meals. 70 acres, three brooks. Brochure.

SERVICES

LAKETON VANS. The complete-service movers. Licensed, Insured, Trustworthy. Get the best for less. Call (212) 966-4552.

LOCATION PHOTOGRAPHY, ANYWHERE. Commercial-industrial. One day notice sufficient. $125/day. **E. G. PRODUCTIONS, N.Y.C., (212) 799-7084.**

MOVING? Professional moving at competitive rates. Anytime, anywhere. Licensed, insured, experienced. **THE COVERED WAGON, ALgonquin 5-1788 (N.Y.C.)**

PERSONALS

"MEMBER, ENDANGERED SPECIES" bumperstrip, 2/$1; 6/$2.50. **IDEA HOUSE, Box 178-T, Rye, N.Y. 10580.**

PROTEST unavailability of abortions in 5 of the world's 12 most populous metropoles—Paris, Buenos Aires, Chicago, Sao Paulo, Bombay. **POB 4069, N.Y.C. 10017.**

PATCHES & APPLIQUE (over 200), **POSTERS** (over 275, many anti-war) **BUTTONS** (135), **BUMPER-STICKERS** (50) and other peace items. Wholesale and retail. Catalogue with pictures 25¢ (refund 1st order). **BIG-LITTLE STORE, 1077 Mission, San Francisco, Ca. 94103.**

ABOLISH ALL ABORTION LAWS without exception. The right of each ratiocinating individual to own his or her own body is the paramount moral law, WITHOUT EXCEPTION.—**AAAL, P.O.B. 36122, Los Angeles 90036.**

NOW is the time for war tax resistance. The most powerful acts against war have been those of the young men of the Resistance who have said **NO** to the draft. Now it is time for those of us who have been paying for the war in Indochina to say **NO** to taxes for war. **Join us! War Tax Resistance, 339 Lafayette St., N.Y., N.Y. 10012. Write and ask for information. Phone: (212) 477-2970.**

HUMANISM: Position of Buckminster Fuller, Carl Rogers, Erich Fromm, B. F. Skinner, Thomas Szasz, Julian Huxley, Bertrand Russell, is a complete philosophy and movement for humane social action. Free information. **American Humanist Association, Dept. TN, 7692, San Francisco, CA 94120.**

ADVERTISING RATES

Classified: 74c a line (6 words) 3 line min.

Classified Display: $7.42 per inch (min.)

THE NATION, 333 Sixth Ave., N. Y. 10014 242-8400

FILMS/Robert Hatch

My Uncle Antoine is a not very good picture that I found worth seeing for tangential reasons. First among these is that few of us know anything about French Canadian provincial life and that this movie, set in an asbestos-mining town deep in the province of Quebec, is an opening into that world. The effect is somewhat disconcerting—the style is French, right enough, but it has lost its crispness and self-assurance. Irony is muted and turning toward pathos; I did not get the impression, which so often strikes me in true French narratives, that relationships are defined and the furniture of life properly placed.

Of course, no one is going to draw conclusions from one film, and that one rather tentative, but I did find it suggestive that in every instance the women are dominant over the men; it is a balance characteristic of exploited minorities and, as always, it produces a somewhat rancid sexuality. Except for one minor character in a brief opening scene, English-speaking Canada does not appear in the picture, but its implications hang over the steep town like the dust of the asbestos tailings. If, as I think is implied, these people feel besieged in their own country, that would explain the restlessness and irresponsibility that underlie the events of the story.

The Uncle Antoine of the title (Jean Duceppe) runs a general store and undertaking business, a center of activity in the small town that is observed by Benoit (Jacques Gagnon), the nephew whom he has taken into his family. The story is really Benoit's growth toward maturity in the course of approximately a year, and Gagnon is a most rewarding young actor. Or would be if he were better directed. Another attraction, mixed with frustration, is the general vitality and eloquence of a cast that is almost woodenly handled by the director, Claude Jutra. I got the notion that they understood the proceedings much better than he did, and that if they had been allowed to improvise, could have brought the picture to life. As it is, Jutra betrays what looks like insecurity by holding his cast so rigidly to his plan that you can almost see him reflected in their eyes. That is particularly true of Gagnon, whose impish and wonderfully communicative face is forever being exploited in long, intrusive close-ups that vulgarize his genuine sensitivity and clog the action.

Jutra does best with two-person scenes—some of them are gay, some honestly moving; most of them open up some depth of relationship, though even here the director insists on a flattening explicitness. The trouble may be that he is too much inside the picture to grasp how it is moving overall. He himself plays the decent, but lumpish and emotionally starved clerk in Antoine's store, and it is a rare actor/director who can handle the double job without losing the overall scenario.

But for all its shortcomings, I found myself willing to dig out of *My Uncle Antoine* everything it had to offer. In part, that is because it works a new area; but in part also because Jutra's instincts are better in this instance than his achievement. □

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Crossword Puzzle No. 1440

FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS

1 Does it involve an unwarranted assumption? (10)
6 A shining form of 1 down. (4)
10 The part of the aircraft able to get back to her in France? (7)
11 Redoing whatever might be unnoticed? (7)
12 Not the favorite sort of 24 across. (8)
13 Principal thing to do, if thinking of putting on another coat. (5)
15 Made the bark deep, possibly descriptive of the coast. (5)
17 They didn't volunteer to form a duet, since the arrangement is unfamiliar. (9)
19 Finish furniture? The ones who made them probably did. (3,6)
21 Indulged in a strike of material significance? (5)
23 You might 7 this, for a lift. (5)
24 Fundamentally acquainted with a form of 12. (8)
27 Supply weapons to partisans, with possibly this instead of a uniform. (7)
28 Beat, if taking a beating. (7)
29 A different slant on the role of learning? (4)
30 Medical science doesn't help men very much! (10)

DOWN

1 Bony sort of 6. (4)
2 Strange it's not like tin! (7)
3 A beet, by the sound of it, could be a seed plant. (5)
4 Sort of made in a musical embellishment where the movement might otherwise be monotonous. (9)
5 Due to a circle on the building's projection? (5)
7 Super-refined? It's about A-1 to rear up. (7)
8 Giving an 18, and putting down where someone lives. (10)
9 Carefully looks over the head of 3 in little animals. (8)
14 Is the purpose to dance on the billiard table, perhaps? (6,4)
16 Bill might be left 5 with one, if completely exhausted otherwise. (4,4)
18 Record what belongs to you and me with points of conversation. (9)
20 One used to beat up trade. (7)
22 Tote her with difficulty to that place. (7)
24 The unstable part of rigid dynamics? (5)
25 A shortly explosive portion finally changes it. (5)
26 Don't leave a guy like this: (4)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 1439

ACROSS: 1 Calling all cars; 9 Repaper; 10 Scorpio; 11 Uprisings; 12 Atilt; 13 Species; 15 Alabama; 16 Anthill; 18 Equated; 20 Tragi; 21 Circulate; 23 Atheism; 24 Cabbage; 25 Present perfect. DOWN: 1 Circumstantial; 2 La Porte; 3 Impossibilities; 4 Goren; 5 Loses face; 6 Cool as a cucumber; 7 Replica; 8 Portland cement; 14 Selectman; 17 Teacher; 19 Teacake; 22 Recap.

PUBLICATIONS

RADICAL, EXPOSE HEALTH PUBLICATION, reporting unique, frank and practical health information, self help tips. Frauds uncovered. Questions answered. Trial sub. 4 issues $1.00. **LIVE! TN How to Survive On A Dying Planet. West Hurley, N.Y. 12491.**

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION, PUBLIC EDUCATION concern you? Read **CHURCH & STATE** monthly. Year trial subscription $1.99. **Dept. C-1, 8120 Fenton, Silver Spring, Md. 20910.**

HOW TO KEEP YOUR VOLKSWAGEN ALIVE—Complete manual—$6.00. **BIG ROCK CANDY MOUNTAIN**—$4.35. **BOOKPOST, 2770C Broadway, N.Y.C. 10025.**

AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MOTHER JONES
Foreword by Clarence Darrow
Introduction by Fred Thompson
260pp paper $2.95 cloth $7.50
CHARLES H. KERR & CO.
Suite 829, 431 S. Dearborn St.
Chicago, Ill. 60605

Religion's Effect on Children Analyzed: **"BRING ME YOUR YOUNG".** 35¢ (coins). **Box E, Huguenot, N. Y. 12746**

THE NATION'S BEST PUZZLES
Book 3—$2.00
All 3 books—$4.00
Frank W. Lewis
c/o 15 Lakeside Drive
Greenbelt, Md. 20770

LITERARY SERVICES

AUTHORS: WANT TO BE PUBLISHED? Inexpensive subsidy publishing. **MOJAVE BOOKS, 7040-A Darby Avenue, Reseda, California 91335**

MUSIC

FREE 162-PAGE CATALOG offers over 1,000 fine recordings of **Renaissance, Baroque, Classical, Romantic and Modern music.** All late stereo recordings. Highest quality at budget label prices. Available only by mail from **MUSICAL HERITAGE SOCIETY, Box 932 NA, New York, N.Y. 10023.**

RECORDER, GUITAR, GAMBA MUSIC. Write for free listings. **Provincetown Bookshop, 246 Commercial St., Provincetown, Mass. 02657.**

THE GREAT LUNAR OIL STRIKE, 1976
$4.00 postpaid
FULCRUM, Records
Route 1, Box 133
Riner, Virginia 24149

EDUCATIONAL

EXTERNAL DEGREE PROGRAM for well informed, highly motivated adults wishing to complete undergraduate education. Two-week resident periods on Goddard campus alternate with six-month independent study projects carried on at home under faculty supervision. Program leads to Goddard Bachelor of Arts degree. **Write Box E, Adult Degree Program, Goddard College, Plainfield, Vermont 05667.**

ADVERTISE YOUR NEEDS
IN THE NATION

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Annual Report 1971

Reports about Honeywell in Indochina during the first and second halves of 1971 are identical:

Honeywell weapons dropped from American planes have helped to kill, injure, or refugee thousands of Indochinese civilians. There is no substantial difference in the volume in the first and second halves of the year. The outlook for 1972 is clearly, as far as we can ascertain, more of the same.

The Vietnamese woman pictured above was on the receiving end of an antipersonnel device.

Antipersonnel devices manufactured by Honeywell cannot destroy a home, fell a tree, or puncture a tire. They are designed primarily to penetrate human flesh.

A number of people in and around Minneapolis, home of Honeywell, Inc., have tried to persuade the company to cease and desist making these heinous weapons. Honeywell officials have not acceded to the requests. Since Honeywell won't assume its responsibility and stop making these weapons, we want you, as stockholders in America, to help us now mount a national campaign to make Honeywell stop manufacturing antipersonnel (antiperson) weapons. We believe this to be a direct and concrete way of working to end the war in Southeast Asia.

Power never concedes anything without a struggle. It never has and it never will. We need your support in this campaign—join us.

Honeywell Campaign—A Project of Clergy and Laymen Concerned
475 Riverside Dr., New York, N.Y. 10027

name _____

address _____

city _____ state _____ zip _____

Here is my contribution for the Honeywell Campaign:

$250 __ $100 __ $50 __ $25 __ Other __

I want to join the campaign and need more information. __

HONEYWELL KILLS PEOPLE

ETSU LIBRARY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED